Dawkins v. Hysaw, 450 S.W.3d 147

Ethel Nichols Hysaw’s 1947 will devised surface estates to her three children (Inez, Howard, Dorothy) with mineral estates, subject to a non-participating royalty interest for each child’s siblings.
The will’s Paragraph 3 provides three royalty provisions: (i) each child gets 1/3 of 1/8 of all minerals (fractional royalty) for siblings, (ii) each child gets 1/3 of 1/8 royalty (also fractional), and (iii) if any royalty is sold during lifetime, each child shall receive 1/3 of the remainder of unsold royalty (conditional, fractional).
Ethel’s children’s heirs filed a dispute after leases produced royalties; Inez’s descendants argued for fractional fixed royalties to siblings, while Howard and Dorothy’s descendants argued equal sharing; the trial court granted Howard and Dorothy and denied Inez; the appellate court reverses.
Ethel’s 1/3 of 1/8 provisions create fractional royalties (fixed fractions of production) for each sibling’s interest, while the third provision is conditional and contemplates future royalty shares; the will as a whole supports unequal sharing consistent with the fractional royalty structure.
The court concludes the will’s plain language assigns all surface and corresponding mineral rights to each child, subject to two fixed fractional royalties (1/24 of production) for the other two siblings; equal sharing is not mandated by the will.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
What royalty interests did the will convey to the children?	Inez’s descendants: fractional royalties to siblings;	Howard/Dorothy’s descendants: equal sharing of all royalties;	The will conveys fractional royalties (1/24) to each sibling, not equal shares.
Does the second provision negate the first or cause conflict?	Second provision restates the grant without reducing royalty.	Second provision creates conflict by suggesting equal sharing;	No conflict; second provision affirms the first and does not limit surface royalties.
Does the third provision alter the overall royalty sharing?	Third provision could imply equal sharing of the remainder.	Third provision is conditional and does not apply to the fixed fractional royalties.	Third provision is conditional; it does not override the fractional royalty structure.
Is equal sharing implied by the will’s language when read with all provisions?	Intended equal sharing in all royalties.	Language shows fractional, not equal, sharing; cannot rewrite unambiguous terms.	Unambiguous language governs; no mandate for equal sharing.

Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (constructing wills; intent drawn from language; cannot rewrite unambiguous provisions)
Coghill v. Griffith, 358 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2012) (fractional royalty wording; distinguishes fractional royalty from fraction of royalty)
Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008) (fractions of royalties; floating vs fixed fractions)
Tiller v. Tiller, 685 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.App.—Austin 1985) (example of fractional royalty terms)
Hawkins v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 724 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.App.—Waco 1987) (illustrates one-half of one-eighth royalty)
Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. 1991) (language on harmonizing will provisions)