2022 IL 127561
Ill.2022Background
- Dollett Smith collapsed from ventricular fibrillation while exercising at an LA Fitness in Oswego; she stopped breathing and lost a pulse and later suffered permanent brain damage.
- The facility had an AED on site and a staff member trained to use it, but Fitness employees did not apply or use the AED.
- Plaintiff (Leo Dawkins, next friend) sued Fitness for negligence and for willful and wanton misconduct for failing to use the AED; negligence counts were previously dismissed; the willful-and-wanton counts were dismissed by the circuit court under a section 2-619 motion.
- Fitness argued compliance with the Facility Preparedness Act (210 ILCS 74) and the AED Act (410 ILCS 4) (having an AED, a written emergency plan, and a trained operator) barred liability; plaintiff argued the statutes permit recovery for willful and wanton non-use of an AED.
- The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding the statutory language permits liability for willful and wanton failure to use an AED and that a private right of action exists; the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Facility Preparedness Act or AED Act imposes a duty to use an AED (or to refrain from willful/wanton non-use) | The statutes encourage and set standards for AED use; they create a right of action for willful and wanton non-use | The statutes only encourage AED availability and training and do not create a duty to use an AED; compliance immunizes defendants | Statutes, by plain terms, allow civil liability for willful and wanton non-use; a duty to refrain from willful/wanton non-use exists |
| Whether statutory compliance (having AED, plan, trained staff) bars all liability | Even if defendant complied, the statutes preserve claims for willful and wanton non-use | Compliance provides immunity from claims related to AED use or non-use | Compliance does not shield defendants from liability for willful and wanton non-use |
| Whether plaintiff stated a claim for willful and wanton misconduct sufficient to survive a 2-619 dismissal | Complaint alleges facts (knowledge of emergency, AED present, trained employee refused/failed to use AED) that could amount to willful and wanton conduct | Allegations at most plead negligence and are factually insufficient to show willful and wanton misconduct | At the 2-619 stage, taking well-pled facts as true, plaintiff may be able to prove willful and wanton misconduct; dismissal improper |
| Whether a private right of action exists under the Facility Preparedness Act | A private right of action is implied for willful and wanton misconduct | No private right beyond statutory immunities | Court agreed a private right of action exists for willful and wanton misconduct (and Fitness conceded this point) |
Key Cases Cited
- Trim v. YMCA of Cent. Maryland, 165 A.3d 534 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017) (statute distinguishing AED availability vs. duty to use; court distinguished on statutory differences)
- Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church, 509 S.W.3d 886 (Tenn. 2016) (rejected duty to use AED under Tennessee statute; court found distinguishable)
- Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness, 985 N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 2013) (New York Court of Appeals rejected statutory duty to use AED; discussed and distinguished in opinion)
- Croissant v. Joliet Park Dist., 141 Ill.2d 449 (Ill. 1990) (statutory construction principle: avoid absurd results)