2020 IL App (3d) 170702-U
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- On November 18, 2012, Dollett Smith collapsed from ventricular fibrillation while exercising at an L.A. Fitness facility; other patrons tried CPR and called staff. An AED and an employee trained to use it were on the premises, but Fitness employees did not attach or use the AED. Dollett suffered permanent anoxic brain injury.
- Plaintiff Leo Dawkins (individually and as next friend) sued for willful and wanton misconduct (and negligence), alleging Fitness knew of the emergency, had statutory duties and a trained employee, but willfully/wanton ly failed to use the AED, causing injury.
- The facility was covered by the Illinois Physical Fitness Facility Medical Emergency Preparedness Act (PFFMEPA) and the Illinois Automated External Defibrillator Act (AED Act).
- Fitness moved under 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) to dismiss, arguing it complied with PFFMEPA/AED Act (so is immune from suit) and that no legal duty to use an AED exists; the circuit court granted dismissal with prejudice.
- The appellate court reversed, holding (1) the statutes permit civil liability for willful and wanton non-use of an AED, (2) common law duties (and Restatement § 314A duties of an invitor to an invitee) can require reasonable first aid including AED use in appropriate circumstances, and (3) a private right of action can be implied in the PFFMEPA; the case was remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PFFMEPA/AED Act bar civil liability for failure to use an AED | PFFMEPA/AED Act do not bar willful/wanton liability; statutes allow suit for willful/wanton non-use | Statutes eliminate duty to use an AED and immunize compliant facilities from any suit relating to use/non-use | Held: Statutes permit liability for willful/wanton failure to use an AED; their language and purpose support a duty to use in appropriate circumstances |
| Whether common law imposes a duty to use AEDs on fitness staff | Fitness, as invitor, owed a duty to provide reasonable first aid (including AED use) when it knew of the emergency | Fitness contends no common-law duty exists to use an AED | Held: Common-law duty exists under factors for duty and Restatement § 314A (invitor–invitee), so plaintiff may plead facts to support duty to use AED |
| Whether PFFMEPA preempts or abrogates common-law remedies | Plaintiff: statutes do not abrogate common-law remedies and expressly preserve willful/wanton liability | Defendant: statutory scheme and administrative penalties show legislature intended to limit private suits | Held: No abrogation; statutes narrowly immunize negligence but not willful/wanton misconduct; implied private right of action is appropriate |
| Whether plaintiff pleaded willful and wanton conduct sufficiently to survive a 2-619 dismissal | Plaintiff alleged facts showing knowledge of danger, trained staff present, failure to follow medical plan/AED prompts, and resulting severe injury | Defendant argued allegations are conclusory and cannot show willful/wanton or proximate causation | Held: Accepting well-pled facts, plaintiff could prove a set of facts amounting to willful/wanton misconduct; dismissal under § 2-619(a)(9) was improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist., 207 Ill. 2d 359 (2003) (purpose of § 2-619 motions to dispose of issues of law and readily proved facts)
- Kean v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 235 Ill. 2d 351 (2009) (§ 2-619 admits legal sufficiency and well-pled facts)
- Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443 (2012) (pleadings construed in favor of nonmoving party on § 2-619)
- Snyder v. Heidelberger, 2011 IL 111052 (2011) (plaintiff survives dismissal if any set of facts supports claim)
- Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422 (2006) (adoption of Restatement § 314A duties for invitor–invitee)
- Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455 (1999) (test for implying a private right of action)
- Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267 (1994) (definition and spectrum of willful and wanton conduct)
- Salte v. YMCA of Metro. Chicago Found., 351 Ill. App. 3d 524 (2004) (distinguished — health club had no AED or trained staff)
- Croissant v. Joliet Park Dist., 141 Ill. 2d 449 (1990) (avoid statutory constructions that produce absurd results)
- Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379 (1982) (administrative enforcement does not necessarily preclude an implied private right of action)