Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP
6:17-cv-00101
S.D. Ga.Sep 15, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Glynn N. Davis, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, worked for Wal‑Mart Stores East, LP as an Operator from Dec. 2007 to Oct. 2014 and had documented physical impairments (hands, ankles, lower back, left knee) that limited major life activities.
- Davis engaged with Workers’ Compensation and received some workplace accommodations over several years; she was terminated and reinstated in Feb. 2015, then placed on an unpaid leave in May 2015 and ultimately recorded as a voluntary termination on Aug. 8, 2016 for failing to return from leave.
- Davis filed EEOC charges in July 2015 and Nov. 2016, received a right‑to‑sue notice April 25, 2017, and filed this Complaint July 23, 2017 alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under the ADA.
- She alleges Wal‑Mart knew of her disabilities, refused reasonable accommodations or reassignment within her restrictions, and told her she would not be reconsidered for positions because none were or would be available.
- The Court screened the pro se Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and concluded Davis pleaded sufficient facts for ADA discrimination, failure‑to‑accommodate, and retaliation claims to survive screening and authorized service by the U.S. Marshals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disability discrimination under the ADA | Davis is disabled, was qualified, and was discriminated against when Wal‑Mart failed to accommodate and denied positions | (Not detailed in opinion at screening) | Court found Davis alleged sufficient facts for discrimination claim to survive screening |
| Failure to reasonably accommodate | Davis alleges Wal‑Mart knew her disabilities, she could perform work with accommodation, and Wal‑Mart refused reassignment/accommodation | (Not detailed at screening) | Court held the Complaint sufficiently alleges failure to accommodate and survives screening |
| Retaliation for requesting accommodation | Davis asserts she engaged in protected activity by requesting accommodations and then suffered adverse action (denial of positions/termination) causally linked to requests | (Not detailed at screening) | Court concluded Davis pleaded facts adequate for a retaliation claim (but must show but‑for causation later) |
| Exhaustion/timeliness of administrative remedies | Davis filed EEOC charges and received right‑to‑sue within the statutory periods | (No opposing timeliness argument considered at screening) | Court found the EEOC charges and filing date indicate timely exhaustion and suit is timely as pled |
Key Cases Cited
- Frazier‑White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.) (elements for ADA discrimination and retaliation claims)
- Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir.) (definition of discrimination under ADA context)
- Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir.) (failure to accommodate can constitute unlawful discrimination)
- Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir.) (elements of failure to accommodate claim and undue hardship principle)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (U.S.) (but‑for causation standard for retaliation claims under Title VII)