Davis v. Vaughn
126 So. 3d 33
| Miss. | 2013Background
- Danielle born 2000 to Theresa (mother) and William Daniel Vaughn (father); Theresa died when Danielle was 17 months old.
- Danielle lived with maternal grandmother (Davis) under an informal arrangement while Vaughn attended school and worked.
- In August 2004 Davis filed for custody; Vaughn agreed to a temporary custody order giving Davis physical custody and biweekly visitation to Vaughn.
- Chancellor later awarded permanent physical custody to Davis, finding Vaughn forfeited the natural-parent presumption; the Court of Appeals affirmed relying on Grant v. Martin.
- The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed (Vaughn II), held the temporary agreed order did not forfeit the presumption, and remanded to determine whether Vaughn had deserted Danielle.
- On remand the chancellor, applying Smith v. Smith, concluded Vaughn had not deserted or otherwise lost the natural-parent presumption and awarded custody to Vaughn; this decision is affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Davis) | Defendant's Argument (Vaughn) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether in loco parentis alone can rebut the natural-parent presumption | Davis: a de facto parent who stood in loco parentis should be able to obtain custody without proving parent forfeiture | Vaughn: in loco parentis does not, by itself, overcome natural-parent presumption | Court: Reaffirmed that in loco parentis alone cannot rebut the presumption; third party must show abandonment, desertion, immorality, or unfitness |
| Whether Vaughn forfeited the natural-parent presumption by agreeing to the 2004 temporary order | Davis: the agreed order functionally relinquished Vaughn’s custodial claim | Vaughn: agreement was temporary and did not relinquish parental presumption | Court: Temporary agreed order did not constitute forfeiture (Vaughn II); remand considered other bases for rebuttal |
| Whether Vaughn deserted Danielle prior to the custody petition | Davis: Vaughn’s limited contact and support amounted to desertion | Vaughn: his conduct did not amount to desertion; he later matured and sought relationship | Court: Chancellor’s factual finding that Vaughn did not desert was supported by the record and not clearly erroneous |
| Whether the chancellor applied correct legal standards and abused discretion | Davis: court misapplied precedents and undervalued Davis’s in loco parentis role | Vaughn: chancellor applied Smith and correct standards; findings supported by evidence | Court: Chancellor applied correct law and findings were neither manifestly wrong nor clearly erroneous; judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Smith, 97 So.3d 43 (Miss. 2012) (third‑party in loco parentis does not, by itself, rebut natural‑parent presumption)
- Vaughn v. Davis (Vaughn II), 36 So.3d 1261 (Miss. 2010) (temporary custody agreement did not forfeit natural‑parent presumption; remand to consider desertion)
- Grant v. Martin, 757 So.2d 264 (Miss. 2000) (natural parent who voluntarily relinquishes custody by court order may forfeit presumption)
- Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003 (Miss. 1983) (Albright factors govern best‑interest custody analysis)
- Leverock v. Hamby, 23 So.3d 424 (Miss. 2009) (discussion of natural‑parent presumption and third‑party custody challenges)
- Petit v. Holifield, 443 So.2d 874 (Miss. 1984) (definition/distinction of abandonment and desertion)
- Farve v. Medders, 128 So.2d 877 (Miss. 1961) (definition and rights of one standing in loco parentis)
- Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (U.S. 1944) (parents’ primary role in custody, care, and nurture of children)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (parental liberty interest and standards for terminating parental rights)
- Mabus v. Mabus, 847 So.2d 815 (Miss. 2003) (standard of appellate review in custody matters)