Davis v. United States Parole Commission
Civil Action No. 2020-2897
| D.D.C. | Dec 3, 2021Background
- The Parole Commission must hold a "local revocation hearing" no later than 65 days after retaking a parolee or supervised-releasee; these hearings let the accused contest alleged violations.
- Plaintiffs Dominique Davis and Rodney Spriggs sued on behalf of a putative class of D.C. code offenders who had not received an in-person revocation hearing within 65 days, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel in-person hearings during COVID-19.
- After suit, the Commission issued a March 22, 2021 memorandum resuming in-person local revocation hearings with one exception: witnesses (both adverse and friendly) testify remotely per the D.C. Department of Corrections (DOC).
- Both named plaintiffs were released from Commission custody after filing; the Commission argues these developments moot the case and moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).
- Plaintiffs invoked the voluntary-cessation and inherently-transitory exceptions to mootness; the court examined the Commission’s memorandum, the class definition, and the record about other detained releasees.
- The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice as moot, and gave plaintiffs leave to refile an amended complaint identifying plaintiffs with live claims by December 24, 2021.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Commission’s return to in-person hearings moots claims challenging fully-remote hearings | The memorandum is litigation-driven and not binding; voluntary-cessation exception prevents mootness | The March 22 Memorandum publicly commits the Commission to in-person hearings and disavows a return to fully remote hearings, so challenged conduct has ceased | Memorandum carries presumption of regularity for a government actor; voluntary-cessation exception does not apply — claims about fully-remote hearings are moot |
| Whether the sole remaining issue (remote witness testimony) is live given plaintiffs’ release | Plaintiffs say the inherently-transitory exception applies because detention-like claims can end before class certification | Defendants say named plaintiffs’ release moots their claims and plaintiffs haven’t shown other class members with ongoing, live claims | Inherently-transitory exception fails: plaintiffs did not show record assurance that other class members with live claims will persist throughout litigation; claims moot |
| Whether the Commission’s memorandum lacked required formality (so cannot moot case) | Memorandum is legally meaningless unless adopted via notice-and-comment or majority vote, so it may not prevent recurrence | No formal rulemaking was required to resume the pre-COVID in-person status quo; courts credit agency statements of intent without particular formality | Court rejects a special formality requirement; public memorandum and commitment suffice to rebut recurrence concern |
| Whether any effective relief remains given named plaintiffs’ release | Plaintiffs argue class mechanism and public defender counsel could represent others; class definition might be inherently transitory | Defendants point to lack of evidence of other class members, class definition frozen at filing date, and many releasees were freed or chose to delay revocation hearings | Because no live individual claims are shown and no assurance of persistent class members, the court cannot grant relief; dismissal without prejudice granted |
Key Cases Cited
- Conservation Force, Inc. v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (mootness defeats jurisdiction; courts must dismiss moot cases)
- United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (case is moot when no reasonable expectation the wrong will recur)
- Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 628 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (party asserting mootness bears initial heavy burden; opposing party must show exception applies)
- CREW v. Wheeler, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019) (voluntary-cessation doctrine; government actor‘s policy pledge can carry weight)
- PETA v. USDA, 918 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (presumption of regularity when government officials publicly commit to act)
- J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (inherently transitory exception to mootness for class actions; two-part test)
- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (class certification in detention challenges often implicates inherently transitory doctrine)