Davis v. United States
670 F.3d 48
| 1st Cir. | 2012Background
- FTCA claims against United States for deaths of Debra Davis and Deborah Hussey arising from FBI handlers’ alleged reckless interference with informants Bulger and Flemmi.
- District court found FBI negligence and awarded damages to the estates for loss of consortium and pain-and-suffering; sanctions were imposed against the United States.
- Chronology shows FBI handlers’ conduct spanned from 1964 onward, including tips, protections, and missteps that hindered prosecution of Bulger and Flemmi.
- Deaths occurred in 1981 (Davis) and 1984/85 (Hussey); bodies discovered in 2000; Flemmi pled guilty in 2003.
- Massachusetts law governs causation and damages under the FTCA, with the district court applying state tort principles to proximate cause and damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FBI negligence was a but-for and proximate cause of the murders under MA law | Davis/Hussey assert but-for causation and foreseeability make FBI conduct a substantial factor | United States contends causation is not proven; foreseeability insufficient | Yes; but-for and proximate causation satisfied; FBI actions were a substantial factor. |
| Whether loss-of-consortium damages are recoverable under MA statute | Davis asserts loss of consortium survived and is compensable | Government argues Hey v. Prime bars such recovery | Remains compensable; the statute preserves loss-of-consortium damages. |
| Whether the $350,000 awards for pain and suffering were an abuse of discretion | Davis/Hussey seek higher awards based on gruesome fatalities | District court’s figures are within the range in similar cases | Not an abuse; awards within reasonable range given comparable cases. |
| Whether sanctions against the United States were proper and severable from merits | Sanctions were warranted for baseless defense | Some aspects may be baseless, but not all; sanctions should be limited | Affirmed in part; sanctions reversed for Davis; vacated and remanded for Hussey to re-evaluate harassment finding. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 849 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 2006) (foreseeability of general harm suffices for proximate cause under MA law)
- McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262 (1st Cir. 2006) (distinguishes mere omission from active intervention in proximate causation)
- Johnson v. Summers, 411 Mass. 82, 577 N.E.2d 301 (Mass. 1991) (reckless disregard factors in determining causal relation)
- Leavitt v. Brockton Hospital, Inc., 454 Mass. 37, 907 N.E.2d 213 (Mass. 2009) (duty limitations and intervening causes; hedges liability)
- Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 379 Mass. 212, 396 N.E.2d 987 (Mass. 1979) (dynamic view of damage to the person; emotional damages survive certain actions)
- Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474, 84 N.E.141 (Mass. 1908) (historical view of damage to the person; later statutory evolution)
- Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009) (non-economic damages and discretion under FTCA)