Davis v. the State
2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 429
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In March 2005 Davis was diagnosed HIV-positive (CD4 count 36) after hospital testing; his doctor counseled him about transmission and prescribed antiretroviral treatment.
- In 2011–2012 Davis had an intimate relationship with C.M.; she later tested HIV-positive and testified she had been negative before the relationship. She reported that Davis denied his status until after her diagnosis and later told a detective he had contracted HIV from another woman and that C.M. got it from him.
- In 2012 Davis engaged in sexual contact with the victim without disclosing his HIV status; the victim later complained and the State charged Davis with two counts of reckless conduct under OCGA § 16-5-60(c) (which requires an “HIV infected person” knowingly engaging in sexual acts without disclosure).
- At trial the State introduced C.M.’s infection as similar-act evidence; Davis presented OMSJ-affiliated experts who challenged the validity of HIV testing and attributed symptoms to crack use, and Davis testified inconsistently about the nature of his sexual encounters.
- On appeal Davis argued (1) the court erred by admitting testimony that he transmitted HIV to C.M. (other-act evidence) and (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by calling/using experts who opined that HIV tests are unreliable.
- The Court affirmed: it found the similar-act evidence admissible under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) and rejected the ineffective-assistance claim as a reasonable strategic choice to challenge the State’s proof of an essential element (that Davis was an HIV-infected person).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of other-act evidence (C.M.’s HIV infection) | Admission was improper because transmission is not an element and evidence was unduly prejudicial | State: C.M.’s infection and Davis’s knowledge are highly probative of Davis’s HIV status and knowledge | Court: Admitted under OCGA § 24-4-404(b); relevance and probative value outweighed prejudice and sufficient proof supported jury finding of transmission |
| Ineffective assistance for presenting OMSJ experts | Counsel unreasonably vetted/used agenda-driven experts whose testimony harmed credibility | Counsel: Strategic choice to attack State’s ability to prove the element that Davis was HIV-infected; experts provided alternate theory | Court: No ineffective assistance. Strategy to present alternative defenses and expert proof was within reasonable professional judgment; not so unsound that no reasonable lawyer would pursue it |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes deficient performance and prejudice test for ineffective assistance)
- Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650 (explains standard for admissibility of other-act evidence and proof-by-preponderance for other acts)
- Johnson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding admission of prior partners’ HIV-status testimony as probative of defendant’s status and knowledge)
- Issa v. State, 340 Ga. App. 327 (supports that alternative defense theories can be reasonable strategic choices)
- Baugh v. State, 293 Ga. 52 (recites Strickland principles in Georgia context)
- Head v. Taylor, 273 Ga. 69 (deference to strategic choices by counsel)
- Humphrey v. Nance, 293 Ga. 189 (expert selection is a strategic decision generally insulated from ineffective-assistance claims)
- Adem v. State, 300 Ga. App. 708 (wide discretion afforded defense in calling experts)