Davis v. the State
340 Ga. App. 652
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 1995 Barry Davis pleaded guilty to aggravated sodomy of his six-year-old daughter and was sentenced to ten years (two to serve); probation ended in 2005.
- OCGA § 42-1-12 (sex-offender registration) was enacted ~1996 and required Davis to register; he later moved to North Carolina without notifying the Chatham County sheriff.
- On Feb. 13, 2013 the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles granted Davis an "unconditional" pardon, stating all disabilities under Georgia law resulting from the conviction were removed and most civil/political rights restored (explicitly excepting firearm rights).
- The State indicted Davis for failing to register as a sex offender; Davis moved to dismiss (general demurrer / plea in bar) arguing the Board’s pardon removed the registration duty as a legal disability.
- The trial court denied the motion, holding registration is regulatory (not a removable legal disability); the Court of Appeals granted interlocutory review and reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Davis) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does an unconditional pardon removing "all disabilities under Georgia law" relieve a pardoned person from sex-offender registration duties? | Pardon’s language removed all legal disabilities including registration; therefore no offense. | Registration is regulatory, not a "disability," and the pardon did not explicitly except registration. | Yes. The Board’s unconditional pardon removing "all disabilities" eliminated Davis’s duty to register. |
| Whether the Court may review the Board’s pardon or its motives/evidence | Challenge limited to scope/meaning of the pardon; not the Board’s decision. | State sought access to Board file to show intent to preserve registration duty. | Courts must respect separation of powers; cannot disturb or review propriety of pardon—only its scope. |
| Whether extrinsic materials (Board website, staff statements) can define pardon scope | The pardon’s text controls; extrinsic website statements are inadmissible to vary plain language. | Website language purportedly stated pardons do not relieve registry duty. | Reject extrinsic website statements absent record evidence; interpret pardon text as written. |
| Whether Rule/Regulatory text limits "disabilities" to voting/office/jury | Pardon’s phrase "all disabilities under Georgia law" is broad; Board knows how to except rights (it did for firearms). | Board rule language references voting/office/jury suggesting limited meaning. | "Disabilities" not limited to those examples; phrase construed in favor of grantee—includes registration. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ferguson v. Perry, 292 Ga. 666 (Ga. 2013) (disability includes incapacity created by law; Board commutation removing "all disabilities" restored rights)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (sex-offender registration is regulatory, not punitive)
- Pate v. State, 318 Ga. App. 526 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (courts cannot usurp Board’s exclusive executive clemency functions)
- Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (U.S. 1927) (pardon is part of constitutional scheme; interpret restrictions narrowly against sovereign)
- Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (U.S. 1958) (freedom of movement is a fundamental liberty interest relevant to registration consequences)
- Gregory v. Sexual Offender Registration Review Bd., 298 Ga. 675 (Ga. 2016) (public dissemination, reporting, and monitoring associated with sexual offender classification implicate liberty interests)