Davis v. State
329 Ga. App. 797
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- In February 2005, twelve-year-old K.C. and her six-year-old nephew went to Melvin Davis’s home to collect money; Davis locked K.C. in his bedroom, removed clothing, and had vaginal intercourse with her; the assault lasted 10–15 minutes and Davis ejaculated inside her. K.C. reported the rape, had a hospital sexual-assault exam showing a fresh vaginal abrasion and male DNA (insufficient for a profile), and later missed a period.
- In late April 2005, an OB exam showed K.C. was ~9 weeks pregnant; she had an abortion in early May and the clinic preserved fetal tissue in formaldehyde and delivered it to the GBI.
- The GBI received the fetal tissue in May 2005 but did not analyze it until October 2005; no usable DNA was obtained (formaldehyde likely inhibited recovery); the sample was destroyed in January 2007.
- Davis was convicted by a jury of rape, aggravated child molestation, and enticing a child for indecent purposes; he appealed the denial of his motion for new trial raising three main claims.
- On appeal Davis argued (1) improper destruction of biological evidence (statutory and due process violations), (2) erroneous jury instruction shifting the burden of proof, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for various tactical choices; the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Davis’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether destruction of fetal tissue violated OCGA § 17‑5‑56 | Clinic/GBI destroyed evidence that could exonerate Davis or show pregnancy post‑assault; statutory protection of biological evidence violated | § 17‑5‑56 covers biological evidence collected at time of the crime that can identify the perpetrator; fetal tissue from abortion was collected months later and was contaminated so statute doesn’t apply | Statute not violated (evidence not within §17‑5‑56’s plain language) |
| Whether destruction violated due process | Tissue could have been exculpatory (e.g., showed impregnation post‑assault); its destruction prejudiced Davis | Tissue was contaminated on receipt (no usable DNA), so it lacked apparent exculpatory value; no bad faith by State in destruction | No due process violation (not constitutionally material; no bad faith) |
| Whether jury instruction impermissibly shifted burden of proof | Trial court told jurors “burden shifts to the defendant to prove innocence,” which places burden on defendant | Overall charge, both oral and written, properly instructed presumption of innocence and State’s burden beyond a reasonable doubt; slip was inadvertent and harmless | No reversible error (instruction as whole correct; harmless slip) |
| Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance | Counsel failed to investigate alternative sources of pregnancy/injury, failed to exclude pregnancy evidence, and failed to object to prosecutor’s closing | Counsel pursued a plausible strategy (attack victim credibility; rely on pregnancy timing; treat destroyed DNA as favorable); objections were not reasonably likely to change outcome | No ineffective assistance (strategy reasonable; no prejudice shown) |
Key Cases Cited
- Chase v. State, 285 Ga. 693 (statutory construction; plain language controls)
- Mussman v. State, 289 Ga. 586 (due process test for lost/destroyed evidence; materiality and bad faith)
- Bridges v. State, 268 Ga. 700 (no burden on defendant to prove innocence; review of jury charge as whole)
- Pitchford v. State, 294 Ga. 230 (inadvertent slip of the tongue in jury charge may be harmless)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
- Hampton v. State, 279 Ga. 625 (standards for ineffective assistance review)