Davis v. State
297 Neb. 955
Neb.2017Background
- In 1995 Davis pled no contest and was sentenced as a habitual offender; in 2012 he was paroled.
- Nebraska amended its habitual criminal statute in 1995 to create a mandatory minimum that affected parole eligibility; the amendment became effective after Davis committed the offense but before sentencing.
- In 2014 the Department miscalculated release/parole dates for some prisoners; an unknown person added Davis to a warrant list and he was directed to turn himself in despite his protests that the mandatory minimum did not apply.
- Davis was reincarcerated for about 59 days after protesting the calculation and then released; he alleged loss of employment, property, and severe emotional harms.
- He sued the State, the Department, the Parole Board, and various state officials (in official and individual capacities) asserting (a) negligence under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA) and (b) § 1983 claims for violation of due process and the Eighth Amendment.
- The district court dismissed all claims; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding the negligence claim barred by the STCA false‑imprisonment exception and the § 1983 claims barred by absolute or qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether STCA bars Davis's negligence claim | Davis: claim is routine negligence (miscalculation); State consented generally to tort suits | State: claim arises from false imprisonment and fits STCA exception | Held: claim facially alleges false imprisonment; STCA exception bars suit (sovereign immunity) |
| Whether STCA exceptions can be raised sua sponte/on appeal | Davis: State waived exceptions by not pleading them | State: exceptions are jurisdictional and may be raised anytime | Held: STCA exceptions are jurisdictional; court may consider them sua sponte and on appeal; prior contrary Nebraska authority overruled insofar as it treated exceptions as waivable by failure to plead |
| Whether Parole Board and members are subject to § 1983 liability | Davis: revocation here was ministerial (calculation) so no quasi‑judicial immunity | State: Parole Board performs quasi‑judicial functions and is an arm of the State | Held: Parole Board is an arm of the State (11th Amendment); its members have absolute quasi‑judicial immunity for parole decisions; § 1983 claims against them dismissed |
| Whether Department employees are subject to § 1983 liability in personal capacity | Davis: Department employees were deliberately indifferent to his protests; discovery needed on individual roles | State: employees entitled to qualified immunity; no clearly established right to error‑free parole calculation | Held: Although deliberate indifference can violate 8th/14th Amendments, law was not clearly established here; Department employees entitled to qualified immunity; § 1983 claims dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (states and arms of the state are not "persons" under § 1983)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (parolees have a liberty interest requiring procedural protections)
- Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (short-term detention despite protests does not automatically create a Fourteenth Amendment violation)
- United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (FTCA discretionary‑function principles and pleading standard)
- Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (personal‑capacity § 1983 suits vs. official‑capacity suits distinction)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity framework allowing flexible sequencing of prongs)
- Sherrod v. State, 251 Neb. 355 (Nebraska case on STCA exceptions; partially overruled regarding waiver of immunity defenses)