Davis v. State
297 Neb. 955
Neb.2017Background
- In 1995 Davis was sentenced as a habitual criminal; a 1995 statutory amendment later created a mandatory minimum that affected parole eligibility and probation eligibility.
- Davis was paroled in 2012; in 2014 he was arrested and reincarcerated for ~59 days after the Department (or someone) miscalculated parole eligibility and added him to an arrest list; Davis repeatedly protested that the mandatory-minimum did not apply.
- The Parole Board revoked parole at a July 2014 hearing and Davis was re-released in August 2014; he later filed an STCA tort claim and a § 1983 action alleging negligence, due process and Eighth Amendment violations by Parole Board and Department officials.
- Defendants moved to dismiss; district court dismissed all claims (sovereign/quasi-judicial immunity for Board; discretionary function/STCA immunity; qualified immunity and pleading deficiencies for § 1983 claims).
- Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed de novo, held (1) STCA intentional-tort (false imprisonment) exception is jurisdictional and may be considered sua sponte/on appeal, (2) Davis’s STCA negligence claim is barred as a claim arising from false imprisonment, and (3) § 1983 claims were properly dismissed because the Parole Board and members are immune and Department officials are entitled to qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether STCA waiver permits Davis’s negligence claim | Davis: claim is negligent miscalculation by officials, not intentional false imprisonment | State: claim arises from unlawful reincarceration and falls within STCA exception for false imprisonment | Held: claim facially arises from false imprisonment; STCA bars it (exception jurisdictional) |
| Whether State may raise STCA exception for first time on appeal | Davis: State forfeited by not pleading; prior Nebraska cases required State to plead exceptions | State: may raise jurisdictional STCA exception at any time | Held: exceptions are jurisdictional; court may consider them sua sponte or on appeal; overruled contrary aspects of prior Nebraska authority |
| Whether Parole Board and its members are subject to § 1983 suit | Davis: Board wrongly applied statute; revocation was ministerial or based on Department error so Board lacks quasi-judicial immunity | State: Board and members have quasi-judicial/11th Amendment immunity; Board is an arm of the State | Held: Parole Board/members have absolute quasi-judicial immunity; Board is an arm of the State and cannot be sued under § 1983 |
| Whether Department employees are individually liable under § 1983 (qualified immunity) | Davis: officials were deliberately indifferent to his protests and failed to investigate; factual development needed | State: officials are entitled to qualified immunity; no clearly established right to error-free revocation or prompt investigation in these circumstances | Held: dismissal appropriate—plaintiff plausibly alleges deliberate indifference, but law was not sufficiently clearly established as to revocation/miscalculation of parole eligibility; qualified immunity shields defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (U.S. 1989) (States and state agencies are not "persons" under § 1983)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (parolees have a liberty interest protected by due process)
- Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1979) (short detention in face of protest did not automatically violate Fourteenth Amendment)
- United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (U.S. 1991) (discretionary function doctrine and pleading standards under FTCA)
- Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (U.S. 1991) (personal-capacity § 1983 suits and official-capacity distinctions)
- Sherrod v. State, 251 Neb. 355 (Neb. 1997) (prior Nebraska precedent treating STCA exceptions as affirmative defenses; overruled in part here)