Davis v. State
297 Neb. 955
Neb.2017Background
- In 1995 Davis was sentenced as a habitual criminal after pleading to violent offenses; in 2012 he was paroled.
- A 1995 legislative amendment created mandatory minimums for habitual criminals; Davis contends the amendment did not apply to him and his parole eligibility was correctly calculated under earlier law.
- In 2014 the Department (DOC) arrested Davis after a recalculation error; despite Davis’s protests that the mandatory-minimum did not apply, the Parole Board revoked his parole and he was reincarcerated ~59 days before release.
- Davis sued the State, DOC, the Parole Board, and various officers (official and individual capacities) alleging negligence under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA) and § 1983 claims (due process and Eighth Amendment) for deliberate indifference and unlawful reincarceration.
- The district court dismissed all claims (sovereign/quasi‑judicial immunity, qualified immunity, and pleading defects); the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds: STCA false‑imprisonment exception (jurisdictional) and immunity doctrines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether STCA bars Davis’s negligence claim | Davis: claim is negligent miscalculation by DOC/agents, not intentional tort, so STCA waiver applies | State: claim arises from unlawful detention (false imprisonment) so STCA exception bars suit | Held: claim facially arises from false imprisonment; STCA §81‑8,219(4) exception applies; tort claim barred by sovereign immunity |
| Whether State can raise STCA exception for first time on appeal | Davis: State waived defenses by not pleading them below | State: may assert exceptions | Held: STCA exceptions are jurisdictional when facially apparent; State may raise them sua sponte or on appeal; prior contrary Nebraska cases overruled to that extent |
| Whether Parole Board/members are liable under §1983 | Davis: Board wrongly relied on DOC calculation; revocation here was ministerial, not discretionary | Defendants: Parole Board acts quasi‑judicially; absolute immunity; Board is arm of State (11th Amendment) | Held: Parole Board members have quasi‑judicial absolute immunity for revocation decisions; Board is an arm of the State and not a proper §1983 defendant |
| Whether DOC employees are liable under §1983 (personal capacity) | Davis: employees were deliberately indifferent to repeated protests and failed to investigate promptly | Defendants: qualified immunity; no clearly established right to error‑free revocation or clearly established duty to investigate with the timing alleged | Held: Although allegations could show deliberate indifference, the law was not clearly established as to prompt investigation of a parolee’s miscalculation claim; qualified immunity applies; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (states and state agencies are not "persons" under § 1983 for money damages)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolees have a liberty interest requiring minimal procedural protections before revocation)
- Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (short erroneous detention does not automatically constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation)
- United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (FTCA discretionary‑function doctrine and pleading standard when governmental policy presumes discretion)
- Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (personal‑capacity § 1983 suits may proceed against state officials notwithstanding state sovereign immunity)
- Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified immunity requires clearly established law and objective legal reasonableness)
- S.R.P. ex rel. Abunabba v. U.S., 676 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing when FTCA exceptions are jurisdictional and may be considered on appeal)