Davis v. State, 297 Neb. 955

Background

Davis was reincarcerated for ~59 days in 2014 after state officials concluded he was subject to a 1995 mandatory-minimum habitual-offender provision; he had repeatedly protested the calculation.
He sued the State, the Department of Correctional Services, the Nebraska Board of Parole, and multiple officers (official and individual capacity) asserting (a) negligence under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA) and (b) § 1983 claims for due process and Eighth Amendment violations.
The district court dismissed all claims, concluding sovereign/qualified/quasi-judicial immunity or pleading defects barred relief.
On appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court considered (1) whether STCA exceptions are jurisdictional and can be raised sua sponte on appeal, (2) whether Davis’s negligence claim is barred as an STCA false-imprisonment exception, and (3) whether § 1983 claims survive against the Parole Board and individual defendants (absolute or qualified immunity).
The Court treated the complaint’s allegations as true and examined (a) whether the false-imprisonment exception precludes the STCA claim and (b) whether the Parole Board (quasi-judicial/arm of the State) and Department employees are immune under § 1983.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether exceptions to the STCA waiver are waivable defenses or jurisdictional (may be raised sua sponte on appeal)	Sherrod-based line: State must plead exceptions; Davis relied on that precedent	State: exceptions are jurisdictional and may be considered for first time on appeal	Court: STCA exceptions that facially bar a claim are jurisdictional; they may be raised sua sponte or on appeal (overruling cases to the extent they allowed waiver by failure to plead)
Whether Davis’s negligence claim may proceed under the STCA or is barred by the false-imprisonment exception	Davis: claim arises from negligent miscalculation of parole date (ministerial/repairable error), not intentional tort; thus STCA waiver applies	State: claim arises from unlawful reincarceration (false imprisonment) so §81-8,219(4) bars it	Held: Allegations show unlawful restraint (reincarceration). False-imprisonment exception applies; negligence claim against State/actors is barred
Whether the Parole Board and its members are subject to § 1983 liability	Davis: board’s revocation relied on Department calculation; board was not exercising discretion on eligibility calculations so quasi-judicial immunity should not bar suit	Defendants: Parole Board performs quasi-judicial discretionary functions; it is an arm of the State and immune under the 11th Amendment; members have absolute immunity for quasi-judicial acts	Held: Parole Board is an arm of the State and its members performing parole decisions have quasi-judicial absolute immunity; §1983 claims against them are barred
Whether Department employees can be held liable under § 1983 or are protected by qualified immunity	Davis: Department employees were deliberately indifferent to his protests and failed to investigate promptly; discovery needed to identify responsible actors	Defendants: no clearly established right to error-free revocation; even if mistaken, they are entitled to qualified immunity	Held: Although deliberate indifference can state a §1983 claim, the law was not clearly established for delayed investigation of a parolee’s miscalculation complaint here; Department employees are entitled to qualified immunity
Whether the district court erred by dismissing with prejudice without leave to amend	Davis: sought leave to amend at hearing; dismissal foreclosed curing defects	Defendants: dismissal appropriate given jurisdictional bar and immunity defenses	Held: Amendment would not cure the jurisdictional/ immunity defects; dismissal affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Jacob v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 294 Neb. 735 (Neb. 2016) (procedural posture / pleading standards cited)
Pratt v. Nebraska Bd. of Parole, 252 Neb. 906 (Neb. 1997) (parole-eligibility duties described as ministerial in different context)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolees hold a liberty interest requiring at least minimal procedural protections)
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (short detention in face of protests did not automatically give rise to federal due process violation)
Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (discretionary-function analysis and pleading expectations)
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (personal-capacity §1983 suits and liability principles)
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (states and arms of the state are not “persons” under §1983)