Davis v. State
297 Neb. 955
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 1995 Davis committed felonies; after a 1996 plea he was sentenced as a habitual offender. An amendment creating a mandatory minimum for habitual criminals took effect in Sept. 1995 (after the crimes but before sentencing).
- Davis was paroled in 2012. In 2014 the Department miscalculated release/parole eligibility dates for some inmates; Davis was mistakenly arrested and turned himself in after being told his eligibility date was miscalculated.
- Davis repeatedly told Department and Parole Board officials that the mandatory minimum did not apply to him and that his release date was correct; the Department did not investigate and the Parole Board revoked his parole, resulting in ~59 days’ reincarceration before he was released again.
- Davis sued the State, the Department, the Parole Board, and multiple officials (official and individual capacities) for negligence under the Nebraska State Tort Claims Act (STCA) and for § 1983 violations (due process and Eighth Amendment). The district court dismissed all claims.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court considered (1) whether STCA exceptions are jurisdictional such that the State may raise them for the first time on appeal, (2) whether Davis’s negligence claim is barred as a false-imprisonment exception to the STCA waiver, and (3) whether Parole Board members and other officials are immune from § 1983 claims (absolute or qualified immunity).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether STCA exceptions are waivable affirmative defenses or jurisdictional | Davis relied on prior state cases saying the State must plead exceptions | State argued false-imprisonment exception bars claim and may be raised on appeal | Court: STCA exceptions can be raised sua sponte/on appeal; prior contrary holdings overruled insofar as they allowed waiver by failure to plead |
| Whether negligence claim under STCA is barred by the false-imprisonment exception | Davis: claim is negligence (miscalculation), not intentional false imprisonment; relief should survive | State: core injury is unlawful reincarceration — falls into STCA exception for false imprisonment | Court: Davis’s negligence claim arises from unlawful reincarceration and is facially barred by STCA false-imprisonment exception; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether Parole Board and its members are subject to § 1983 suit | Davis: Board acted ministerially regarding eligibility calculation; no discretion; so immunity shouldn't apply | Defendants: Board functions are quasi-judicial/discretionary; absolute immunity and Eleventh Amendment bar § 1983 suits | Court: Parole Board is an arm of the State and its members have quasi-judicial absolute immunity for parole decisions; § 1983 claims against Board/officials in official capacity barred |
| Whether Department employees are liable under § 1983 or entitled to qualified immunity | Davis: officials were deliberately indifferent to his protests and failed to investigate, causing prolonged unlawful detention | Defendants: no clearly established right to error-free parole revocation; at most negligence; qualified immunity applies | Court: Although Davis pleaded deliberate-indifference facts, law was not clearly established for prompt-investigation duty in parole-revocation context; Department employees entitled to qualified immunity; claims dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state agencies and officials sued in official capacity are not "persons" under § 1983 for money damages)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolees have a protected liberty interest; parole revocation requires at least minimal procedural protections)
- Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (short-term detention despite protests does not automatically constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation)
- United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (FTCA discretionary function analysis and pleading standard—plaintiff must allege facts showing conduct not grounded in policy when presumption of discretion applies)
- Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (personal-capacity § 1983 suits may proceed against state officials; capacity sued is the relevant inquiry)
- Sherrod v. State, 251 Neb. 355 (1997) (discussed and overruled in part by court regarding whether STCA exceptions are waivable by defendant's failure to plead)
- Jacob v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 294 Neb. 735 (2016) (cited for pleading standard and context regarding sentencing/administration)