Davis v. State
297 Neb. 955
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 1995 Davis pled no contest and was sentenced as a habitual offender; in 2012 he was released on parole. In 2014 the Department miscalculated (or purportedly miscalculated) his parole eligibility date, a warrant was issued, and Davis surrendered and was reincarcerated for ~59 days despite protesting that the mandatory-minimum statute did not apply to him.
- Davis sued the State, the Department of Correctional Services, the Board of Parole, multiple current and former state officials (in official and individual capacities), and the Attorney General, alleging negligence under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA) and § 1983 claims for violation of due process and the Eighth Amendment.
- At dismissal stage defendants moved under Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(1) and (6); the district court dismissed all claims, finding sovereign/quasi‑judicial immunity and qualified immunity or pleading defects.
- On appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed de novo, addressed whether STCA exceptions are jurisdictional and may be raised sua sponte on appeal, and examined (1) whether the negligence claim was barred by the STCA false‑imprisonment exception and (2) whether § 1983 claims were barred by sovereign, quasi‑judicial, or qualified immunity.
- The court concluded Davis’s STCA negligence claim was, on its face, a claim arising from false imprisonment and therefore barred by the STCA exception; it also held Parole Board members had quasi‑judicial immunity and the remaining state employees were protected by qualified immunity (no clearly established right to prompt relief in the circumstances).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether STCA permits suit against state actors for Davis’s negligence claim | Davis: miscalculation/negligence by Department and Board caused unlawful reincarceration; STCA waiver applies | State: claim arises from false imprisonment, an STCA exception; sovereign immunity bars suit | Held: Claim facially arises from false imprisonment; STCA exception bars tort suit (court may consider exception sua sponte on appeal) |
| Whether STCA exceptions are waivable affirmative defenses or jurisdictional | Davis: State forfeited the defense by not raising it below | State: exception jurisdictional; may be raised anytime | Held: Exceptions that show lack of consent to suit are jurisdictional; may be raised sua sponte or on appeal; prior contrary Nebraska authority overruled to that extent |
| Whether Parole Board and its members are subject to § 1983 suit | Davis: Board improperly revoked parole based on ministerial calculation; no absolute immunity | Parole Board: functions are quasi‑judicial (grant/deny/revoke) and thus absolutely immune; Board is an arm of the State | Held: Parole Board is an arm of the State (11th Amendment); members performing quasi‑judicial functions have absolute immunity; § 1983 claims against Board/members dismissed |
| Whether Department employees may be liable under § 1983 (personal capacity) | Davis: employees were deliberately indifferent to his protests and failed to investigate promptly | State: qualified immunity applies; no clearly established right to error‑free process or prompt relief in these circumstances; pleading deficiencies | Held: Dismissed — Department employees entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs did not show violation of a clearly established right under the specific facts |
Key Cases Cited
- Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (U.S. 1989) (state agencies and officials sued in official capacity are not "persons" under § 1983 for money damages)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (parolees possess a protected liberty interest requiring at least minimal procedural protections before parole is revoked)
- Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1979) (short, isolated detention errors do not automatically constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation; context and duration matter)
- United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (U.S. 1991) (in FTCA context, when established policy allows discretionary action, complaint must allege facts to overcome presumption of discretion)
- Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (U.S. 1991) (state officials sued in personal capacity can be liable under § 1983; distinction between official and personal capacity liability)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (qualified immunity analysis may address either prong first; immunity is immunity from suit)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S. 2001) (established framework for qualified immunity analysis; later clarified by Pearson)