Davis v. State, 902 N.W.2d 165

Background

In 1995 Davis was convicted and sentenced as a habitual criminal; in 2012 he was paroled. In 2014 the Department revoked his parole after determining (wrongly, Davis alleges) that a 1995 statutory amendment created a mandatory minimum making him ineligible for parole. He was reincarcerated for ~59 days and then returned to parole.
Davis sued the State, the Department of Correctional Services, the Nebraska Board of Parole, and multiple officials (official and individual capacities) for negligence under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA) and for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (procedural/substantive due process and Eighth Amendment), alleging miscalculation of parole eligibility and deliberate indifference to his protests.
Defendants moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed all claims, concluding (inter alia) officials and the Parole Board were immune (quasi‑judicial/discretionary function), the STCA barred the tort claims, and qualified immunity or pleading failures barred § 1983 claims.
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that STCA exceptions are jurisdictional (not forfeitable by the State), and an appellate court may consider such exceptions sua sponte; it found Davis’s negligence claim was facially barred as a claim arising from false imprisonment under § 81‑8,219(4).
The Court also affirmed dismissal of § 1983 claims: the Parole Board and its members are protected by Eleventh Amendment/arm‑of‑the‑state and quasi‑judicial immunity; nonboard Department employees were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that their alleged failure to promptly investigate Davis’s protests violated federal rights.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Davis’s negligence claim can proceed despite STCA exceptions	Davis: tort claim (negligence) against state actors for miscalculating parole eligibility is permitted	State: claim falls within STCA intentional‑tort exception (false imprisonment) and is barred	Held: STCA bars the tort claim as arising from false imprisonment; dismissal affirmed
Whether the State may raise an STCA exception for the first time on appeal	Davis: prior Nebraska cases required State to plead exceptions; State forfeited defense	State: may assert exception now; jurisdictional bar	Held: exceptions are jurisdictional; appellate courts may consider them sua sponte or raised on appeal; prior contrary Nebraska authority overruled insofar as it suggested waiver by failure to plead
Whether the Parole Board and its members are liable under § 1983	Davis: Board improperly revoked parole based on miscalculation; § 1983 damages available against individuals	Defendants: Board is an arm of the State and members perform quasi‑judicial functions → Eleventh Amendment and absolute immunity; official‑capacity suits barred	Held: Board is an arm of the State (not a § 1983 “person”) and members have quasi‑judicial absolute immunity; § 1983 claims against them dismissed
Whether Department employees are personally liable under § 1983 (qualified immunity)	Davis: employees were deliberately indifferent to his repeated protests and failed to investigate, causing unlawful detention	Defendants: qualified immunity applies; law did not clearly establish a right to an error‑free revocation or a prompt investigation in these circumstances	Held: dismissal affirmed — employees entitled to qualified immunity because a clearly established federal right to a prompt investigation of a parolee’s revocation claim was not sufficiently established on these facts

Key Cases Cited

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (states, state agencies, and officials sued in official capacity are not § 1983 “persons” for damages)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolees have due‑process liberty interest; parole revocation requires minimum procedural safeguards)
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (short erroneous detention does not automatically constitute Fourteenth Amendment violation; duration and culpability matter)
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (where policy confers discretion, FTCA discretionary‑function exception applies and complaint must allege facts overcoming the presumption of discretionary conduct)
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (personal‑capacity § 1983 suits may impose individual liability; official‑capacity suits generally bar money damages)