Davis v. State, 2014 Ark. 17

Robert Davis was convicted by a jury in 2010 of capital murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced as a habitual offender to life without parole.
On direct appeal, Davis challenged the admission of Latasha Smith’s out-of-court statement to a police detective claiming he admitted killing someone at Meadowcliff; Smith later testified she did not recall the statement’s subject matter.
The trial court permitted voir dire to explore Smith’s memory and mental state; defense did not cross-examine after direct examination.
Davis then filed a pro se Rule 37.1 petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel; the trial court denied relief without a hearing.
This Court dismissed the appeal as moot, finding Davis could not prevail on any postconviction relief appeal, and affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief.
The opinion discusses the Strickland two-prong standard and applies it to Davis’s various ineffective-assistance arguments, ultimately rejecting them.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did counsel’s failure to cross-examine Smith prejudicially affect the outcome?	Davis argues lack of cross-examination prevented credibility assessment.	Smith’s memory defects were explored via voir dire; further cross-examination would not have changed outcome.	No reversible prejudice; voir dire and memory issues adequately explored.
Was there an affirmative defense or accomplice liability issue Davis could have raised?	Scales as an equal participant could have been used to acquit Davis.	Prosecutor decides charges; law treats principals and accomplices similarly; no basis to compel charging Scales as accomplice.	No merit; accomplice-liability framework does not create a new defense.
Did counsel’s communication failures or discovery issues amount to ineffective assistance?	Counsel failed to provide discovery, reports, and transcripts, prejudicing Davis.	Defense did not show how prejudice occurred from lack of communications.	Insufficient showing of prejudice under Strickland; no due-process violation established.
Did appellate counsel’s failure to raise meritorious issues render representation defective?	Counsel should have raised issues that could have yielded reversible error.	No identified meritorious issues; failure to raise does not prove ineffective assistance.	Not ineffective appellate counsel; no demonstrable deficiency.

Jordan v. State, 2013 Ark. 469 (Ark. 2013) (per curiam; postconviction relief appeal generally lacks merit if no reasonable probability of success)
Holliday v. State, 2013 Ark. 47 (Ark. 2013) (per curiam; standard for denying postconviction relief without a hearing)
Bates v. State, 2012 Ark. 394 (Ark. 2012) (per curiam; framework for assessing Rule 37.1 petitions)
Martin v. State, 2012 Ark. 312 (Ark. 2012) (per curiam; postconviction appeal procedural standards)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Taylor v. State, 2013 Ark. 146 (Ark. 2013) (Strickland framework applied to ineffective-assistance claims)
Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104 (Ark. 2007) (strong presumption of reasonable trial counsel performance; prejudice required)
Holloway v. State, 2013 Ark. 140 (Ark. 2013) (prejudice and standard under Strickland evaluation)
Abernathy v. State, 2012 Ark. 59 (Ark. 2012) (counsel performance review standards)
Wainright v. State, 307 Ark. 569 (Ark. 1992) (precedent on ineffective assistance standards)
Troutt v. State, 292 Ark. 192 (Ark. 1987) (historical Strickland guidance in Arkansas)
Walton v. State, 2013 Ark. 254 (Ark. 2013) (requirements to show ineffective appellate counsel)
Payton v. State, 2011 Ark. 217 (Ark. 2011) (per curiam; Rule 37.1 prejudice framework)
Thacker v. State, 2012 Ark. 205 (Ark. 2012) (indigent petitioner burden in Rule 37.1 proceedings)