Davis v. Professional Representatives Organization
666 F. App'x 433
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Davis, an AFSCME employee, pled guilty to embezzling $197,983 from a school district on Sept. 2, 2014; AFSCME removed him from duties Sept. 3, suspended him without pay, held a disciplinary hearing, and terminated him on Sept. 18, 2014.
- AFSCME had warned Davis—based on counsel and OLMS guidance—that 29 U.S.C. § 504 could bar continued union employment upon a guilty plea and that it would terminate him if he pled guilty.
- Davis asked his union unit (PRO) to grieve and then to arbitrate; PRO initially declined arbitration citing § 504, later filed then withdrew an arbitration demand after Davis’s sentence/prison term.
- Davis filed a hybrid § 301 suit against AFSCME (breach of CBA/wrongful termination) and PRO (breach of duty of fair representation), seeking back pay for the period Sept. 3–Dec. 29, 2014 (the date the criminal judgment was entered).
- The district court granted AFSCME’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding AFSCME reasonably could treat the guilty plea as triggering § 504, and denied Davis’s motions for reconsideration/relief.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding Davis failed to plead facts showing AFSCME lacked "just cause" to terminate and that AFSCME reasonably relied on § 504 interpretations and its regulatory ability to adopt stricter standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AFSCME breached the CBA by terminating Davis after his guilty plea (i.e., whether AFSCME had "just cause") | Davis: § 504 does not bar employment until the court enters formal judgment, so guilty plea alone cannot support just cause. | AFSCME: § 504 and OLMS interpretation can reasonably be read to treat a guilty plea (or plea + disposition) as a conviction; union faced criminal/fine risk if it retained him and may adopt stricter rules. | Held: Affirmed dismissal — Davis failed to plead facts showing lack of just cause; AFSCME reasonably terminated him to avoid § 504 liability. |
| Whether § 504’s term "convicted" begins at plea or at formal judgment | Davis: statutory text means conviction = date of judgment; plea alone is not conviction for § 504. | AFSCME: OLMS guidance, legislative purpose, and caselaw support treating guilty pleas (or plea + disposition) as conviction; unions may adopt stricter standards. | Held: Court found § 504 ambiguous but agency interpretation, legislative history, and caselaw reasonably support AFSCME’s view that a guilty plea could trigger § 504. |
| Whether PRO breached its duty of fair representation by refusing arbitration | Davis: PRO delayed/withdrew arbitration and allowed internal politics to block arbitration. | PRO: PRO relied on § 504 interpretation and acted within discretion; arbitration refusal was reasonable given perceived bar. | Held: Court did not reach merits because Davis failed to plead employer breach; both claims must succeed and wrongful termination failed. |
| Whether district court abused discretion in denying reconsideration/new-evidence relief | Davis: New email from OLMS official stating conviction date = sentencing is newly discovered evidence that would change result. | AFSCME/District Court: The email is non-binding, lacks reasoned analysis (no Chevron weight), and would not change outcome because AFSCME could still reasonably terminate. | Held: Denial affirmed — email is not controlling, lacks persuasive weight, and would not alter the result. |
Key Cases Cited
- DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (hybrid § 301 claim requires proving both employer breach and union DFR breach)
- Harmon v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 371, 832 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1987) (guilty plea can constitute a "conviction" under § 504 in context of deferred-judgment/probation schemes)
- Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927) (older Supreme Court statement that a guilty plea may be treated as a conviction)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (agency interpretations are persuasive to the extent they have power to persuade)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (limits on Chevron deference; non-rule agency letters get Skidmore weight)
- Garrison v. Cassens Transp. Co., 334 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2003) (both employer and union claims required for hybrid § 301 success)