Davis v. Pace Suburban Bus Division of the Regional Transportation Authority
191 N.E.3d 776
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- In March 2017 Dwayne Davis fell forward on a Pace bus after the driver braked suddenly when an unidentified white Lexus nosed toward the bus’s lane; Davis suffered serious spinal injuries.
- Davis filed two suits: a coverage action against his insurer (Progressive) seeking uninsured/hit‑and‑run coverage based on the Lexus, and a tort action against Pace and the bus driver alleging their negligence caused his injuries.
- The chancery court (coverage case) held the Lexus was a proximate cause and awarded uninsured/hit‑and‑run coverage; Progressive paid the $50,000 policy limit.
- In the tort action Davis’s expert testified the Pace defendants were the sole proximate cause and the Lexus was not negligent.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Pace based on judicial and collateral estoppel and, on reconsideration, alternatively ruled after reviewing video that the Lexus was the sole proximate cause.
- The appellate court reversed: collateral estoppel and summary judgment on proximate cause were improper; judicial estoppel applied but only to bar Davis from asserting a sole‑proximate‑cause theory against Pace (not to dismiss the suit entirely).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judicial estoppel bars Davis from asserting that Pace was the sole proximate cause | Coverage suit focused on contract/coverage and not inconsistent; multiple proximate causes possible | Davis prevailed in coverage case by alleging Lexus proximate cause; later claiming Lexus blameless is factually inconsistent and benefited Davis | Judicial estoppel applies; Davis is estopped from asserting a sole‑proximate‑cause theory against Pace but may still litigate that Pace was a proximate cause (just not sole cause) |
| Whether collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of proximate cause | The coverage court already found Lexus proximately caused Davis’s injuries | The prior adjudication did not decide the comparative allocation of fault among Lexus, Pace, and Davis | Collateral estoppel inapplicable—issues were not identical and prior judgment did not resolve percentages or comparative fault |
| Whether summary judgment for Pace is proper because Lexus was the sole proximate cause (based on video) | Video and facts show Lexus entirely caused the event; no genuine issue of material fact | Expert testimony and video allow competing inferences about fault allocation | Summary judgment on proximate cause improper; proximate cause is fact‑intensive and triable issue remains |
| Appropriate remedy when judicial estoppel applies (dismissal vs narrower relief) | Dismissal unnecessary; lesser sanction sufficient | Full dismissal is justified where positions are irreconcilable and party benefited | Equity requires a tailored remedy here: bar Davis from arguing Lexus was not negligent or that Lexus was not a proximate cause; do not terminate the tort suit |
Key Cases Cited
- Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432 (2015) (judicial estoppel prerequisites and de novo review when estoppel produces summary‑judgment dismissal)
- Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229 (1986) (summary judgment standard)
- Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 154 Ill.2d 90 (1992) (summary judgment is drastic and should be granted only when right is clear)
- Smeilis v. Lipkis, 2012 IL App (1st) 103385 (2012) (judicial estoppel barred relitigation where plaintiff changed irreconcilably to pursue remaining defendant after large settlement)
- Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill.2d 251 (2004) (plaintiff must show proximate cause to be legally entitled to recover)
- Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Rosen, 242 Ill.2d 48 (2011) (purpose of uninsured/hit‑and‑run coverage to place insured in position of suing an unidentified tortfeasor)