Davis v. New York City Department of Education, 804 F.3d 231

Catharine E. Davis, a DOE teacher, was absent ~4 months (Oct 29, 2008–Mar 1, 2009) after a car accident; a substitute (Ms. Byrd) taught in her stead.
J.H.S. 302 participated in a school-wide performance bonus program governed by a CBA that gave a school compensation committee discretion over individual bonus allocations and an oversight committee power to modify awards.
The school earned a total bonus pool; most full-year teachers received $3,000, but Davis received $1,000 after the committee split an award with her substitute.
Davis filed internal and EEOC disability-discrimination charges and sued under the ADA, claiming the reduced bonus was disability-based discrimination.
The district court granted DOE summary judgment, reasoning (erroneously, per the Second Circuit) that a discretionary bonus reduction could not be an adverse employment action; it also held Davis failed to show discriminatory motivation.
The Second Circuit affirmed: it rejected the district court’s categorical rule about discretionary bonuses but found Davis offered insufficient evidence that disability discrimination motivated the bonus decision.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether reduction/denial of a discretionary bonus can be an "adverse employment action" under the ADA	Davis: $2,000 reduction from $3,000 was an adverse action harming terms/conditions of employment	DOE: Bonus was discretionary under CBA; no entitlement to $3,000, so reduction not actionable	Court: Rejected categorical rule; discretionary status alone does not preclude adverse-action finding, but not dispositive here
Whether DOE’s bonus decision was motivated by disability discrimination	Davis: Reduction was based on her disability-related absence after car accident	DOE: The reduction reflected Davis’s four-month absence and the substitute’s contribution to earning the bonus — a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason	Court: Affirmed summary judgment for DOE — plaintiff failed to produce evidence that prohibited discrimination played any role in the decision

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for disparate treatment claims)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (plaintiff must persuade that discrimination was a motivating factor once employer articulates a nondiscriminatory reason)
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (importance of plaintiff’s burden after employer explanation)
Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (elements of ADA employment discrimination claim)
Sanders v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 2004) (definition of materially adverse action affecting terms/conditions of employment)
Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000) (Title VII principles on motivating factor evidence apply to employment discrimination claims)
Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000) (held discretionary pay increase withholding cannot be adverse action — rejected as categorical rule by this court)
Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejected categorical rule that denial of discretionary bonus cannot support discrimination claim)