Davis v. Dynamic Offshore Resources, L.L.C., 865 F.3d 235

Background

Plaintiff Thomas Davis, a crane mechanic employed by an independent contractor (Gulf Crane Services), was injured during a personnel-basket transfer to Dynamic Offshore’s 86A platform when the basket dropped several feet.
No Dynamic employees were present on the 86A platform; all platform workers (including the crane operator) were independent contractors.
Davis had "stop work authority" and decided to delay the winch replacement for safety reasons; he asked to be lifted to the 86A platform to call Dynamic’s foreman from the platform phone.
During that personnel transfer the basket allegedly dropped because the crane operator swung the basket into the wind, and Davis immediately felt pain in his shoulder, back, and knees.
Davis sued Dynamic for negligence and gross negligence; the district court granted summary judgment for Dynamic, holding it was not vicariously liable for its independent contractors.
On appeal the Fifth Circuit considered whether (1) personnel-basket transfers are ultrahazardous, and (2) Dynamic expressly or impliedly authorized an unsafe practice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are personnel-basket transfers an ultrahazardous activity that makes a principal liable for contractor acts?	Personnel-basket transfers are dangerous; the activity caused injury so principal should be liable.	Personnel-basket transfers are not per se ultrahazardous under Louisiana law.	Not ultrahazardous as a matter of law; no exception to nonliability.
Did Dynamic expressly or impliedly authorize an unsafe manner of performing the transfer?	Dynamic is liable because its instructions to replace the winch led to the transfer and the unsafe condition (high winds).	Dynamic did not order the transfer or direct the manner; Davis requested the transfer and could have exercised stop-work authority; Dynamic relied on contractor expertise.	No evidence Dynamic authorized the unsafe manner; no vicarious liability.
Was summary judgment inappropriate given factual disputes about wind and operator conduct?	Davis pointed to wind and operator swinging into wind as disputed facts precluding summary judgment.	Even accepting facts in Davis's favor, Dynamic did not authorize unsafe practice or perform ultrahazardous activity.	Summary judgment affirmed; factual disputes did not establish legal duty or authorization by Dynamic.
Did Dynamic have a duty to supervise the independent contractor’s safety methods?	Dynamic should be responsible for safety of work on its platforms.	No duty to supervise contractor’s performance or methods absent authorization of unsafe practice.	Dynamic had no duty to supervise in a way that creates liability; entitled to rely on contractor expertise.

Key Cases Cited

Bartholomew v. CNG Producing Co., 832 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1987) (principal generally not liable for independent contractor acts; two Louisiana exceptions exist)
Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1987) (ultrahazardous activities require more than ordinary risk; need something per se hazardous)
Hawkins v. Evans Cooperage Co., 766 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1985) (whether an activity is per se ultrahazardous is a question of law; principals may rely on contractor expertise)
Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659 (5th Cir. 2001) (standard of review for summary judgment is de novo)
Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc., 364 So.2d 604 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) (principal liable only if it expressly or impliedly authorized the particular unsafe manner that caused injury)