Davis v. Bud and Papa, Inc.
885 F. Supp. 2d 85
D.D.C.2012Background
- Davis sues Layla Lounge for assault, battery, IIED, and negligence after a post-midnight confrontation with security at the DC nightclub.
- Davis alleges a security guard shoved her and tasered her neck during the altercation; the club is sued on a theory of vicarious liability (respondeat superior).
- Defendant Bud and Papa, Inc. moves for summary judgment on all counts, arguing negligence requires expert testimony and that some claims fail without it.
- Plaintiff opposes on the negligence issue and maintains assault, battery, and IIED do not require expert proof; the court partially denies in part and grants in part.
- The court ultimately grants summary judgment on the negligence claims (abandoned by Davis) but denies summary judgment on assault, battery, and IIED, allowing those claims to proceed to trial; it also rejects new arguments raised in reply as to affidavits and consent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether expert testimony is required for negligence claims. | Davis asserts standard negligence proof suffices; expert is not required. | Expert testimony is necessary to define the standard of care in crowd-control/public-safety torts. | Negligence claims dismissed as abandoned; remaining claims survive. |
| Whether assault, battery, and IIED require expert testimony to proceed. | These intentional torts do not require expert testimony. | Expert testimony is necessary to prove the relevant standard of care. | Denied summary judgment; claims survive for trial. |
| Whether plaintiff's affidavits raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient for trial. | Affidavits from plaintiff and sister establish personal knowledge of events. | Affidavits lack foundation for taser specifics; consent defense moot. | Evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact; trial warranted. |
| Whether consentbar to liability negates claims for taser use. | Consent to some contact does not excuse alleged unlawful taser use. | Consent may shield conduct if within scope; however, taser legality and scope are factual issues. | Consent defense not resolved on summary judgment; trial needed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195 (D.C. 1991) (expert testimony required when subject is beyond lay knowledge; otherwise not)
- District of Columbia v. Hampton, 666 A.2d 30 (D.C. 1995) (expert testimony required only if subject is too technical for lay juror)
- Varner v. District of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260 (D.C. 2006) (case-by-case determination on necessity of expert testimony in torts)
- Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d 569 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (rejects blanket rule that expert testimony is always required for security-tort cases)
- Edwards v. Okie Dokie, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2007) (district court can require expert when appropriate; may be inapplicable to all security operations)
- Halcomb v. Woods, 767 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2011) (note that not all IIED cases require expert testimony; depends on facts)
- Evans v. Washington Ctr. for Internships & Acad. Seminars, 587 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.D.C. 2008) (consent and conduct issues addressed at summary judgment; fact-intensive)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard; movant must show absence of genuine dispute)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment credibility and material facts viewed in light most favorable to non-movant)