Davis v. Baez
208 So. 3d 747
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Londan Davis, an 18-year-old student, was struck by a car while crossing NE 18th Avenue to reach a school bus stop on the east side; the bus had not yet arrived and it was dark.
- Davis sued Miami‑Dade County School Board and bus driver Neftali Baez; prior appeal (Davis I) dismissed all claims against the School Board for lack of duty because the student was not in the Board’s custody or control when injured.
- Count II of the operative complaint alleges individual negligence against Baez: he told Davis and her brother they were required to cross to the east side before the bus arrived and that he would not wait for them if they were not already there.
- School Board supervisors and driver-training materials state students should wait on the side where they are until the bus arrives, stops, and activates flashing lights and the STOP arm; they testified Baez’s instruction contradicted policy and was dangerously improper.
- Baez moved for summary judgment asserting sovereign immunity and that the prior appellate decision foreclosed liability; the trial court granted summary judgment for Baez and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Davis I bars individual negligence claim against Baez (law of the case) | Davis: Davis I did not decide personal-liability/sovereign-immunity issues; Count II remains viable. | Baez: Davis I’s affirmance that School Board owed no duty forecloses any negligence claim by extension. | Court: Davis I is law of the case on School Board duty only; it does not bar individual-liability claim against Baez based on undertaker allegations. |
| Whether Baez owed Davis a duty by his affirmative directions (undertaker doctrine) | Davis: Baez voluntarily undertook to act by requiring crossing, creating a foreseeable zone of risk and a duty to exercise reasonable care. | Baez: No duty because student was not in School Board custody/control; actions fall within discretionary scope. | Court: Undertaker doctrine applies on these facts; Baez’s instruction could create a duty because it increased foreseeable risk. |
| Whether sovereign immunity bars personal liability for Baez | Davis: If Baez acted outside scope or with bad faith/wanton/willful disregard by requiring crossing contrary to policy, sovereign immunity does not bar suit. | Baez: His acts were within scope of employment and thus protected; Davis I supports immunity. | Court: Genuine factual disputes exist whether Baez acted outside scope or with wanton/willful disregard; summary judgment on sovereign immunity improper. |
| Whether summary judgment was proper | Davis: Material factual disputes (Baez’s statements, training/policy conflicts, testimony of supervisors) preclude summary judgment. | Baez: No disputed material facts; law compels immunity. | Court: Reversed — disputed material facts remain; remand for trial on Count II against Baez. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2009) (reaffirmed undertaker doctrine: voluntary undertaking that increases risk creates duty of reasonable care)
- Union Park Memorial Chapel v. Hutt, 670 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1996) (undertaker doctrine and creation of foreseeable zone of risk)
- Francis v. School Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty., 29 So. 3d 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (school board does not owe duty to students en route to bus stops)
- Harrison v. Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 434 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1983) (school board’s duty of care for transportation begins when student is picked up at bus stop)
- Davis v. City of Homestead, 154 So. 3d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (prior appeal affirming dismissal of School Board claims for lack of duty)