Davis v. Armacost
168 A.3d 1112
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Armacost underwent a four-level anterior cervical discectomy and fusion performed by Dr. Reginald Davis; postoperative complaints culminated in a diagnosed MSSA wound infection months later.
- Armacost sued for medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent; jury trial lasted five days.
- At charge, the court gave both the medical-malpractice standard (care of a reasonably competent health care provider in similar practice/circumstances) and general-negligence instructions (MPJI-Cv 19:1 and 19:3) regarding a “reasonable person” and foreseeability.
- During third-day deliberations the jury asked what would happen if they could not reach unanimity; the court replied a mistrial would result, read a modified Allen (deadlocked-jury) charge, and told jurors to deliberate one more hour and that they would not be brought back the next day.
- Within about an hour the jury returned a verdict for Armacost on malpractice ($329,000) and for Davis on informed consent.
- Davis appealed, arguing (1) the general-negligence/foreseeability instructions were inappropriate in a medical-malpractice case and prejudicial, and (2) the supplemental instructions (modified Allen plus apparent one-hour deadline) were coercive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Armacost) | Defendant's Argument (Davis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether giving general-negligence/foreseeability instructions (MPJI-Cv 19:1 & 19:3) in a medical-malpractice trial was erroneous and prejudicial | Such general negligence principles apply to malpractice; instructions were correct and not prejudicial | Instructions misstated/heightened the standard by inviting jurors to measure a specialist against an ordinary "reasonable person" and to speculate about foreseeability | Error; giving those general-negligence/foreseeability instructions was improper in a malpractice case and prejudicial — reversible error |
| 2) Whether the court’s response to jury (stating mistrial would result), giving a modified Allen charge, and adding an apparent one-hour deadline unduly coerced the jury | Court acted within discretion to explain mistrial, to give a modified Allen charge, and to ask jurors to deliberate one more hour without imposing a binding deadline | Telling jurors a mistrial would follow and imposing a one-hour final window coerced dissenting jurors to abandon convictions | Mixed: telling jurors a mistrial would result and issuing the modified Allen charge were within discretion; however, coupling the Allen charge with an apparent one-hour deadline was unduly coercive — reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187 (Md. 1975) (medical-malpractice standard accounts for a physician’s specialized knowledge)
- Barksdale v. Wilkowsky, 419 Md. 649 (Md. 2011) (erroneous instruction prejudicial when it permits speculation about inapplicable legal principles)
- Kelly v. State, 270 Md. 139 (Md. 1973) (trial court has discretion to use Allen-type charge but must avoid coercion; adhere closely to approved wording)
- Plumley v. State, 4 Md. App. 671 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) (prefacing an Allen charge by noting need for resolution was not abuse of discretion)
- Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (U.S. 1896) (origin of the Allen charge urging jurors to deliberate with a view to reaching agreement)
- Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493 (Ariz. 1978) (refusing ordinary-care instructions in malpractice cases because physicians are judged by professional standard)
- Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron, 29 N.E.3d 921 (Ohio 2015) (foreseeability/ordinary-care instructions inappropriate in most medical-negligence cases)