343 F. Supp. 3d 254
S.D. Ill.2018Background
- Carlos Davila founded A New Beginning and served as an accredited non‑attorney representative under DOJ's Recognition & Accreditation (R&A) Program from 2011 until 2017.
- DOJ revised R&A rules in December 2016; new 8 C.F.R. §1292.12(a)(5) made individuals convicted of a "serious crime" (including felonies) ineligible for accreditation.
- Upon learning of Davila’s 1988 first‑degree manslaughter conviction, OLAP (through Program Director Steven Lang) terminated A New Beginning’s accreditation by letter dated May 10, 2017.
- Davila sued Lang (and sought to hold him in official capacity) alleging RFRA violation, due process (Fourteenth Amendment), APA arbitrary-and-capricious rulemaking, violations of NY Correction Law Articles 23 and 23‑a, defamation, Title VII and equitable defenses; many theories were raised for the first time in opposition papers.
- Lang moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court substituted the United States for Lang under FTCA certification and dismissed claims for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim; some dismissals were without prejudice to replead, others were denied leave to amend as futile.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| RFRA claim | Davila (via A New Beginning) says revocation substantially burdened his religious ministry | Lang/OLAP: RFRA inapplicable; no substantial-burden facts pleaded | Dismissed — plaintiff failed to allege how rule enforcement substantially burdened religious exercise; claim would fail on merits even if considered |
| FTCA/sovereign immunity & defamation | Davila alleges Lang defamed him and seeks relief against Lang individually | Government contends FTCA substitutes U.S., bars suits against employees individually, and FTCA/other waivers don't waive sovereign immunity for defamation or constitutional claims | Defamation claim against Lang in individual capacity replaced by U.S.; claims against U.S. barred by sovereign immunity (defamation and constitutional torts); plaintiff failed to exhaust FTCA administrative remedies; tort claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction |
| Bivens / Due process | Davila claims termination violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights (loss of accreditation) | Lang: Bivens remedy inapplicable; alternative administrative process exists; special factors counsel against extension | Dismissed — new Bivens context and Ziglar special‑factors counsel hesitation; no protected property interest because program confers discretionary accreditation; no procedural due process violation |
| APA arbitrary & capricious; state‑law claims; Title VII | Davila: rulemaking retroactive, arbitrary; OLAP should have considered NY certificate of good conduct; discrimination/Title VII | Lang: rulemaking was notice‑and‑comment, explained basis; federal immigration regulation preempts state law; Davila is not an OLAP employee for Title VII | Dismissed — agency rulemaking was not arbitrary/capricious; federal immigration/regulatory scheme preempts NY Correction Law Articles 23/23‑a; Title VII/NYSHRL/NYCHRL fail because no employer relationship and no pleaded discriminatory motive; equitable estoppel/laches not available against government |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognized implied damages remedy against federal officers under Fourth Amendment)
- Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (courts should hesitate to extend Bivens; consider whether context is meaningfully different and whether special factors counsel hesitation)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA protects religious exercise from substantial government burden)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three‑factor balancing test for procedural due process procedures)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (standard for arbitrary and capricious review under APA)
- FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (United States has not waived sovereign immunity for constitutional torts)
- Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal law governs where uniquely federal interests are involved; does not constitute waiver of sovereign immunity)