Davila v. Davis
137 S. Ct. 2058
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- Erick Davila shot into a birthday gathering, killing two and wounding others; convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.
- At trial the judge gave a transferred-intent jury instruction over defense objection; the jury convicted.
- Appellate counsel challenged sufficiency of evidence but did not challenge the transferred-intent instruction; conviction and sentence were affirmed.
- Davila’s state habeas counsel did not raise an ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim; the Texas court denied state habeas relief.
- In federal habeas, Davila argued his state habeas counsel’s ineffective assistance excused the procedural default of his appellate-ineffectiveness claim under Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler. District court and Fifth Circuit rejected that extension; Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez/Trevino allow state postconviction counsel’s ineffective assistance to excuse procedural default of ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims | Davila: Martinez/Trevino should be extended so ineffective state habeas counsel can supply cause to excuse default of appellate-ineffectiveness claims | State (and majority): Martinez is a narrow equitable exception limited to trial-ineffectiveness claims tied to initial-review collateral proceedings; it should not be extended | No. Court refused to extend Martinez/Trevino to appellate-ineffectiveness claims |
| Whether attorney error in state postconviction proceedings can constitute "cause" to excuse procedural default generally | Davila: attorney error that prevents raising appellate-ineffectiveness claim should be treated as cause | Court: Coleman remains the general rule; attorney error in postconviction proceedings ordinarily cannot supply cause because there is no constitutional right to counsel in such proceedings | Court reaffirmed Coleman: attorney error in postconviction proceedings does not ordinarily constitute cause |
| Whether equitable concerns that justified Martinez apply to appellate-ineffectiveness claims | Davila: appellate-ineffectiveness claims risk escaping review similarly to trial-ineffectiveness claims | Court: trial rights are uniquely important; appellate-ineffectiveness claims by nature arise post-appeal, and States did not deliberately channel them to collateral review; systemic costs would be substantial if expanded | Court held Martinez’s equitable rationale does not extend to appellate-ineffectiveness claims |
| Systemic and federalism impact of expanding Martinez | Davila: expansion would be manageable and fair; like cases should be treated alike | Court: expansion would flood federal courts, create gateway to review of many defaulted trial errors, and burden federalism/comity interests | Court declined expansion due to systemic costs and limited systemic benefit |
Key Cases Cited
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (establishes that attorney errors in state postconviction proceedings generally do not constitute cause to excuse procedural defaults)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (creates narrow equitable exception permitting ineffective-state-habeas-counsel to supply cause for defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in initial-review collateral proceedings)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (clarifies Martinez applies where state procedures effectively force trial-ineffectiveness claims into collateral review)
- Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (recognizes constitutional guarantee of effective counsel on first appeal as of right)
- Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (defines "cause" as an objective external factor and explains attorney error may be "cause" if it amounts to constitutional ineffectiveness)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims)
- Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (attorney error is cause only if it amounts to constitutional ineffective assistance)
- Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (prejudice-and-cause framework for overcoming procedural default)
