Davidson v. United States, 48 A.3d 194

Jorida Davidson was driving under the influence when she struck and killed a pedestrian on October 7, 2010.
The grand jury charged voluntary manslaughter, leaving the scene, and DUI; involuntary manslaughter was not charged in the original indictment.
Trial court gave a ‘reasonable efforts’ instruction to encourage a verdict on the greater offense before considering negligent homicide.
On June 21, 2011, the jury indicated it could not reach a verdict on voluntary manslaughter but returned guilty verdicts on other charges, including negligent homicide.
The court discharged the jury without a verdict on the greater charge and later issued a nunc pro tunc order to reflect a mistrial on the voluntary manslaughter count.
A superseding indictment later charged voluntary manslaughter again and added involuntary manslaughter; the court denied defenses’ motions challenging double jeopardy.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether retrial on voluntary manslaughter is barred by double jeopardy	Davidson argues retrial is barred due to double jeopardy after a verdict on related counts.	The government contends mistrial consent and deadlock permit retrial.	Retrial on voluntary manslaughter permitted; but no prosecution for involuntary manslaughter after negligent homicide.
Whether the involuntary manslaughter charge may be pursued after negligent homicide	Davidson contends successive prosecutions are barred by double jeopardy.	Government argues lesser-included relationship allows separate charge and prosecution.	Bar to involuntary manslaughter prosecution; negligent homicide is a lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter under D.C. law, precluding successive prosecutions.

Brown v. United States, 432 U.S. 161 (U.S. 1977) (lesser-included offenses; double jeopardy bars successive punishment/prosecution)
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (U.S. 1963) (mistrial for manifest necessity permits retrial)
Jorn v. United States, 400 U.S. 470 (U.S. 1971) (plurality; continuing jeopardy and mistrial consent concepts)
Carter v. United States, 497 A.2d 438 (D.C. 1985) (counsel input and juror deliberation considerations for mistrial)
Anderson v. United States, 481 A.2d 1299 (D.C. 1984) (consent to mistrial may be implied from totality of circumstances)
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (U.S. 1980) (statutory construction of multiple predicate offenses in double jeopardy context)