David Young v. McBroom Industrial Services, 327854

Background

David Young left Industrial Control Repair (ICR) to work for McBroom in May 2009; he sued McBroom in 2011 alleging breach of an oral agreement to pay a "signing bonus," provide an ownership interest, and cover attorney fees incurred defending ICR’s suit.
Lehman & Valentino (Lehman), Young’s former counsel, intervened and filed an intervening complaint seeking unpaid attorney fees it incurred representing Young (and McBroom) in the ICR litigation.
Young originally demanded a jury trial in his complaint; Lehman did not. McBroom did not file a separate jury demand after Lehman intervened. The trial court denied McBroom’s motion to confirm a jury trial on Lehman’s intervening claims and the matter proceeded as a bench trial.
After a bench trial, the court (1) awarded Young $42,848.96 as a signing bonus and denied his claim for ownership interest; and (2) awarded Lehman $92,550.08 plus $16,022.22 in case-evaluation sanctions against McBroom.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for Young, vacated the judgment for Lehman, and remanded Lehman’s claims for a jury trial while leaving Young’s bench-trial judgment intact.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Right to jury for Lehman’s intervening claims	Young demanded a jury on attorney-fee issue; that demand covers issues Lehman raised	McBroom: Lehman’s intervening complaint required a separate jury demand; trial court properly denied reliance on Young’s demand	Court: McBroom was entitled to rely on Young’s timely jury demand for the attorney-fee issue; judgment for Lehman vacated and remanded for jury trial
Waiver of jury for Young’s own claims	Young maintained jury demand; case proceeded to bench	McBroom: relied on plaintiff’s jury demand but took actions implying consent to bench trial and did not seek bifurcation	Court: McBroom waived jury as to Young’s claims by its conduct (not objecting, referring to trial as bench trial); Young’s bench-trial judgment affirmed
Breach of contract (signing bonus) — admissibility of parol evidence	Young: written offer was latently ambiguous re: total compensation; extrinsic evidence (check, testimony) shows promise of signing bonus	McBroom: written employment offer was integrated; parol evidence barred; no signing bonus owing	Court: employment offer was latently ambiguous re: income structure; extrinsic evidence admissible; trial court’s factual findings (award of $42,848.96) not clearly erroneous; affirmed
Second case evaluation and sanctions	Young: second evaluation allowed due to excused counsel absence; ordered to pay new panel fees	McBroom: trial court abused discretion by ordering second evaluation after counsel failed to appear	Held: trial court did not abuse discretion to order a second evaluation under MCR 2.410; plaintiff paid panel fees; no prejudice shown

Key Cases Cited

Mink v. Masters, 204 Mich. App. 242 (discussing reliance on another party’s jury demand)
Marshall Lasser, P.C. v. George, 252 Mich. App. 104 (agreement to waive a demanded jury trial may be evidenced in writing or on the record)
Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 473 Mich. 457 (contract interpretation reviewed de novo)
Shay v. Aldrich, 487 Mich. 648 (parol evidence rule and when extrinsic evidence is admissible)
McCarty v. Mercury Metalcraft Co., 372 Mich. 567 (latent ambiguity permits extrinsic evidence)
Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 468 Mich. 459 (court determines parties’ intent when ambiguity exists)
Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr., Inc., 495 Mich. 161 (elements of breach of contract)
Port Huron Ed. Ass’n v. Port Huron Area Sch. Dist., 452 Mich. 309 (patent ambiguity explained)
City of Grosse Pointe Park v. Mich. Muni. Liability & Prop. Pool, 473 Mich. 188 (distinguishing patent vs latent ambiguity)
UAW–GM Human Resource Ctr. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 228 Mich. App. 486 (effect of merger clause on extrinsic representations)
Bates Assoc., LLC v. 132 Assoc., LLC, 290 Mich. App. 52 (appellate parachute doctrine)
Castro v. Goulet, 312 Mich. App. 1 (standard for reviewing a trial court’s exercise of discretion in ADR/case-evaluation matters)