David Turner v. Karl Kendrick v. Danny Anderson
M2016-00884-COA-R3-CV
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Apr 21, 2017Background
- Buyers Karl and Stacey Kendrick entered two purchase agreements with Sellers Turner and Maddox for adjoining properties; dispute arose over Buyers’ failure to close on the vacant lot sold under the November 2012 agreement.
- Sellers sued the Kendricks (Sept. 30, 2013) for breach seeking specific performance and damages; Kendricks answered and counterclaimed (Dec. 11, 2013).
- Nearly two years later (Nov. 24, 2015) the Kendricks filed a third-party complaint impleading real-estate agent Cindy Garvey (and others), alleging negligence, statutory violations, and that Garvey’s acts caused the underlying litigation and defense costs.
- The Kendricks did not move the trial court for leave to file the third-party complaint, although Rule 14.01 requires leave if filed more than 10 days after the answer.
- Garvey moved to dismiss; the trial court dismissed the third-party complaint on two independent grounds: (1) it failed to allege indemnification/contribution/subrogation or other basis for impleader under Valley Fid. Bank & Trust Co. v. Ayers; and (2) it was filed without the leave required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 14.01 after the 10-day window.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the dismissal was within the trial court’s discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Kendricks' Argument | Garvey's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the third-party complaint should be allowed | Impleader proper because agent’s alleged negligence caused Kendricks’ liability to Sellers; claims arise from same transaction so impleader fosters single resolution | Complaint asserts independent claims (negligence/statutory violations) not liability for all/part of Sellers’ claim; no basis for indemnity/contribution/subrogation | Dismissed: complaint did not allege indemnity/contribution/subrogation or other impleader predicate; impleader not proper |
| Whether filing without court leave (filed ~2 years after answer) is fatal | Should be severed or consolidated; court could have allowed consolidation under Rule 42 | Rule 14.01 requires leave if >10 days; Kendricks never sought leave, so dismissal is proper under the rule | Dismissed: filing without required leave justified dismissal; no excuse shown for delay |
| Whether a third-party defendant may move to dismiss under Rule 14.01 | Kendricks suggested severance instead of dismissal | Garvey moved to dismiss under Rule 14.01, asserting grounds to strike third-party claim | Held: Rule 14.01 expressly permits any party to move to strike/sever/seek dismissal; motion proper |
| Whether trial court abused discretion in denying leave and dismissing | Kendricks argued trial court should permit impleader and consolidation | Trial court relied on legal standards and lack of applicable impleader theory; Kendricks offered no justification for two-year delay | No abuse of discretion; appellate court affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Lacy v. Cox, 152 S.W.3d 480 (Tenn. 2004) (rules of civil procedure interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Thomas v. Oldfield, 279 S.W.3d 259 (Tenn. 2009) (statutory/rule construction principles)
- Garrison v. Bickford, 377 S.W.3d 659 (Tenn. 2012) (apply plain meaning of unambiguous rule language)
- Fair v. Cochran, 418 S.W.3d 542 (Tenn. 2013) (court enforces procedural rules as written)
- Valley Fid. Bank & Trust Co. v. Ayers, 861 S.W.2d 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (third-party practice predicates: indemnification, contribution, subrogation)
- Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82 (Tenn. 2001) (abuse of discretion standard defined)
- Allen v. Albea, 476 S.W.3d 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (abuse of discretion involves choice among acceptable alternatives)