897 F.3d 970
8th Cir.2018Background
- In 2015 Arkansas Treasurer Dennis Milligan hired David Singer as assistant for legislative affairs; Singer was repeatedly relieved of duties and, after complaints and concerns about his performance and demeanor following his wife’s death, was fired on April 27, 2015.
- An April 6 email from Chief of Staff Jim Harris to deputy chief of staff Jason Brady criticized Singer; after Singer’s termination FOIA requests were made for Singer’s personnel file and related correspondence.
- The Treasurer’s office (through Grant Wallace, after consulting the Arkansas Attorney General) released the April 6 email in response to FOIA requests; Harris later gave a KATV reporter, Marine Glisovic, a folder containing the same email following her FOIA request.
- Singer sued Harris (individually) for defamation, false light, and invasion of privacy, and added Milligan (officially and individually) asserting Rehabilitation Act and ADA (Title I) claims and a Fourteenth Amendment/name‑clearing claim; defendants moved for summary judgment on multiple claims.
- The district court denied summary judgment on Singer’s Title I ADA claim and on Harris’s individual‑capacity state tort claims (finding disputed issues on malice), but granted summary judgment for Milligan (official capacity) on the Rehabilitation Act claim (Treasurer’s Office does not receive federal assistance) and on other claims; a jury later returned verdicts for defendants on the remaining claims; Singer’s motion for a new trial was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was improper on Harris’s state‑law claims (defamation/false light/invasion of privacy) | Singer contends the court improperly limited liability for the April 6 email and its transmission | Defendants argued disclosure decisions and some communications were immune or not actionable; district court found genuine issues on malice for Harris’s outreach to reporter | Court affirmed: district court did not grant partial summary judgment as Singer asserted and correctly denied summary judgment on Harris’s individual tort claims because disputed facts on malice existed |
| Whether Treasurer (Milligan, official capacity) is subject to Rehabilitation Act claims | Singer argued Treasurer waived immunity because federal funds are deposited in and distributed from the State Treasury to agencies | Defendants argued Treasurer’s Office does not accept or use federal financial assistance itself and merely serves as a depository for agencies that accept funds | Court affirmed summary judgment for Milligan: holding/depositing federal funds for agencies is not ‘‘receiving or distributing’’ federal financial assistance under § 794 and thus no waiver |
| Whether jury instructions were erroneous (publication/FOIA/cat’s paw) | Singer challenged: (1) publication instruction re: Glisovic already possessing the email; (2) refusal to give FOIA instruction to supplement privacy instruction; (3) refusal to give cat’s paw/agency instruction for ADA claim | Defendants supported instructions given and argued FOIA was not a claim against Harris and cat’s paw was unsupported because Milligan independently decided to fire Singer | Court affirmed: publication instruction proper under single‑publication/aggregate‑communication reasoning; FOIA instruction properly refused (no FOIA claim against Harris and Harris didn’t control FOIA release); cat’s paw instruction unnecessary because record showed Milligan made an independent termination decision |
| Whether exclusion of evidence about Singer’s whistle‑blowing was erroneous | Singer contends the court improperly excluded whistleblower evidence | Defendants (and district court) treated the proffer as not properly preserved or shown in the record | Court refused to consider the argument: Singer failed to identify where in the record the exclusion or an offer of proof occurred, so appellate review is waived |
Key Cases Cited
- Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993 (8th Cir.) (summary judgment standard and de novo review)
- Ibson v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 877 F.3d 384 (8th Cir.) (summary judgment standard framing)
- Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir.) (Rehabilitation Act waiver applies only to the agency that actually accepts federal funds)
- Luster v. Retail Credit Co., 575 F.2d 609 (8th Cir.) (treatment of republication and foreseeability under state law)
- Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole, 551 F.3d 193 (3d Cir.) (scope of ‘‘distribute’’ under Rehabilitation Act waiver analysis)
- Semida v. Rice, 863 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir.) (single‑publication/aggregate‑communication rule for contemporaneous intra‑organization distribution)
- Qamhiyah v. Iowa State Univ. of Sci. & Tech., 566 F.3d 733 (8th Cir.) (cat’s paw theory in employment discrimination)
- Dedmon v. Staley, 315 F.3d 948 (8th Cir.) (upholding refusal to give cat’s paw instruction where evidence supported independent termination decision)