David Schlittler v. State, 476 S.W.3d 496

In 2008 David Schlittler was serving a 20-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault of his stepdaughter B.M.; a 2007 court order permanently enjoined him from contacting his son B.S. except during possession periods (none while incarcerated).
While imprisoned, Schlittler used Bonita Ralston (a third party who believed him innocent) to contact B.S. via social media and urged B.S. to get B.M. to recant.
Schlittler was indicted and convicted under Tex. Penal Code § 38.111, which prohibits persons confined after certain sexual-offense convictions from contacting a victim or a member of the victim’s family without specified written consent.
The jury found Schlittler guilty; he was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment and appealed, challenging § 38.111 as unconstitutional as applied to him under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
The appellate court reviewed the statute de novo and considered whether the statute, as applied, unconstitutionally infringed Schlittler’s parental rights or treated him unequally compared to other inmates.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Substantive due process — does § 38.111, as applied, violate parental rights?	Schlittler: statute overly broad; unlawfully infringes his fundamental right to care, custody, and management of his child (B.S.).	State: parental rights were already limited by the 2007 injunction; statute protects victims/families and allows parental consent exceptions, so it is narrowly applied.	Court held no due process violation: protecting victims/families is compelling and statute is narrowed by consent provision.
Equal protection — does § 38.111 create an unjustified class and treat Schlittler unequally?	Schlittler: statute singles out certain offenders (sexual offenses) and therefore unjustifiably burdens parental rights compared to other violent offenders.	State: classification is based on the type of crime (sexually motivated harms to children) and is rationally—indeed compellingly—related to protecting victims; statute applies equally to members of that class.	Court held no equal protection violation: classification justified by the need to protect victims of sexual offenses and applies uniformly to class members.

Render v. State, 316 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010) (constitutional questions reviewed de novo)
State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (as-applied challenge concessions and standards)
Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (court will adopt a reasonable construction to save a statute)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parents have fundamental rights in care, custody, and management of their children)
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (substantive due process framework and strict scrutiny for fundamental rights)
Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (state’s compelling interest in protecting children/victims)
Ex parte Hobbs, 157 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941) (equal application of statutory classifications to class members)
Downs v. State, 244 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007) (equal protection requires similar treatment of similarly situated persons)