David Ramirez v. Charles Ryan, 937 F.3d 1230

Background

David Ramirez was convicted of two 1989 first‑degree murders and sentenced to death; at trial his mitigation presentation was limited and his appointed psychologist (Dr. McMahon) evaluated Ramirez after guilt phase using only materials trial counsel provided.
Trial counsel (a public defender on her first capital case) did not obtain or provide school records and prior IQ test results (scores of 70 and 77) to the psychologist and presented limited family testimony at sentencing.
Post‑conviction counsel in Ramirez’s initial collateral proceeding did not raise an ineffective‑assistance‑of‑trial‑counsel (IAC) claim; Arizona later conceded initial post‑conviction counsel performed deficiently.
In habeas proceedings, new family declarations disclosed severe childhood abuse, neglect, developmental delays, and corroboration of low intellectual functioning that trial counsel had not investigated or presented.
The district court denied relief (finding IAC procedurally defaulted and failing on the merits) but a panel of the Ninth Circuit held Martinez v. Ryan excused the procedural default and remanded for evidentiary development of the IAC claim; the court affirmed that Ramirez’s Ake due‑process claim failed and that Arizona did not apply an unconstitutional causal‑nexus rule to exclude mitigation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Martinez excuses procedural default of IAC at trial	Martinez applies because initial PCR counsel was ineffective and the IAC claim is substantial (trial counsel failed to investigate/present intellectual disability and other mitigation)	Procedural default should stand because the underlying IAC claim fails on the merits (no deficient performance or prejudice)	Martinez excuse applies: IAC procedural default is excused; remand for evidentiary development (cause and prejudice shown)
Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to investigate/present mental impairment and mitigation (Strickland)	Counsel was deficient for not pursuing school/IQ records, not informing/arming the expert, and not presenting available family mitigation; prejudice is substantial when reweighed against aggravation	Counsel made reasonable strategic choices; any omission did not create a reasonable probability of a different sentence	Court finds the underlying IAC claim is substantial (sufficient to satisfy Martinez prejudice prong) and warrants evidentiary development; ultimate merits left to district court
Whether Ramirez was denied due process under Ake by lack of expert assistance	Ramirez argues denial of experts (or insufficient expert assistance) deprived him of an independent psychiatric evaluation helpful at sentencing	State/court provided an independent psychologist (Dr. McMahon) and Ake does not require a mitigation specialist; no Ake violation	Affirmed: no Ake violation — Ramirez had access to an independent psychologist and did not show entitlement to additional experts under Ake
Whether Arizona applied an unconstitutional causal‑nexus rule to exclude mitigation (McKinney claim)	Ramirez contends the state courts required a causal connection between mitigating evidence and the crime and thus excluded important mitigation	State argues its courts did not apply the causal‑nexus rule to Ramirez’s mitigation; trial court and Arizona Supreme Court considered and credited non‑statutory mitigation	Affirmed: Arizona courts did not unconstitutionally apply a causal‑nexus requirement here; mitigating evidence was considered

Key Cases Cited

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (creates narrow exception excusing procedural default of a trial‑level IAC claim when initial PCR counsel was absent or ineffective)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑pronged standard for IAC: deficient performance and prejudice)
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (due process entitlement to state‑provided psychiatric assistance when mental health is genuinely in issue)
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (sentencer must be able to consider any relevant mitigating factor)
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer must consider youth and troubled background as mitigating evidence)
McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015) (Arizona courts improperly excluded nonstatutory mitigation by imposing an unconstitutional causal‑nexus requirement)
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (prejudice analysis requires reweighing totality of mitigation against aggravation)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (counsel has duty to investigate mitigation; Strickland prejudice discussion)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (general rule precluding federal review of procedurally defaulted claims absent cause and prejudice)
Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (standard for certificate of appealability and discussion of whether issues are debatable)