David Pittington v. Great Smoky Mountain Lumberjack Feud
880 F.3d 791
| 6th Cir. | 2018Background
- Pittington worked ~5 months in 2012 for Great Smoky Mountain Lumberjack Feud and was fired in retaliation for supporting his wife’s sexual‑harassment complaint; he alleges Title VII retaliation and sought back pay, front pay, and prejudgment interest.
- At trial the jury found for Pittington on the Title VII/Tennessee Human Rights Act retaliation claims and awarded $10,000 in back pay (no compensatory/punitive damages); district court denied a new trial or amendment but awarded prejudgment interest at the federal §1961 rate (0.66%).
- Pittington testified about his Lumberjack hourly pay (approx. $8, possibly $10.50 after promotion), typical 40‑hour workweek, and subsequent employment/unemployment periods from October 2012 to October 2015; Lumberjack admitted time cards and challenged mitigation/earnings evidence in closing argument.
- Pittington moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)/(e) to increase the back pay or obtain a new trial on damages and to award prejudgment interest (he sought up to 10% under Tennessee law); the district court declined relief except for interest at §1961 rate.
- The Sixth Circuit majority reversed the denial of a new trial on damages and vacated the prejudgment interest decision, holding the district court misapplied legal standards on mitigation and failed to consider case‑specific factors for prejudgment interest; the dissent would have affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion in denying new trial on damages under Rule 59(a) | Pittington argued the $10,000 award was substantially below uncontested proof of back pay (~$35k–$40k) and that Lumberjack bore burden to prove mitigation before damages could be reduced | Lumberjack argued the jury reasonably inferred failure to mitigate and that Pittington failed to prove damages with reasonable certainty | Reversed: district court abused discretion; jury award was substantially less than uncontradicted evidence and Lumberjack failed to prove lack of mitigation |
| Whether district court should alter/amend judgment under Rule 59(e) (additur) | Pittington sought amendment to increase back pay rather than new trial | Lumberjack opposed additur; Seventh Amendment limits court adding damages | Denial of 59(e) was not an abuse of discretion; additur inappropriate unless parties consent or damages are incontrovertible |
| Proper allocation of burden to prove mitigation and interim earnings | Pittington: plaintiff need not prove mitigation until defendant proves availability of comparable jobs and lack of diligence | Lumberjack: jury could infer mitigation failure from Pittington’s testimony and gaps in evidence | Court held burden rests with defendant to prove interim earnings or lack of diligence; district court incorrectly required plaintiff to prove mitigation |
| Appropriate prejudgment interest rate | Pittington: trial court must consider case‑specific factors (make‑whole, inflation, lost use of money); §1961 rate (0.66%) was too low | Lumberjack: plaintiff requested 10% under state law and effectively forfeited other rates; §1961 is reasonable | Reversed: district court erred by applying §1961 rate without considering case‑specific factors (Schumacher factors); remand to select a prejudgment rate consistent with Title VII remedial goals |
Key Cases Cited
- Rasimas v. Michigan Dep’t of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614 (6th Cir.) (Title VII plaintiffs presumptively entitled to back pay; defendant bears burden to prove mitigation)
- Anchor v. O’Toole, 94 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1996) (jury award will be upheld unless it is substantially less than unquestionably proved)
- Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp. Ret. Accumulation Plan, 711 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2013) (district courts must consider case‑specific factors when setting prejudgment interest)
- United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083 (6th Cir. 1998) (prejudgment interest intended to make victims whole; courts may consider market rates)
- Hance v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 571 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2009) (back pay need not be proven with exactitude; ambiguity resolved against employer)
- Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 875 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1989) (defendant bears burden to prove interim earnings or lack of diligence)
- Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (U.S. 1982) (mitigation rule prevents recovery for damages plaintiff could have avoided)