David Peery v. City of Miami, 805 F.3d 1293

Background

This case arises from a long-running § 1983 lawsuit against the City of Miami over arrests and treatment of homeless persons that was resolved by a judicially‑approved settlement agreement (the functional equivalent of a consent decree).
The settlement (approved by the district court) included a $900,000 payment to plaintiffs’ counsel and an express clause (Paragraph 25) limiting future attorneys’ fees to enforcement proceedings after non‑binding mediation.
Paragraph 30 of the agreement provided for modification of the agreement by written consent or upon a showing of significant changed circumstances, subject to court approval; it did not authorize attorneys’ fees for modification proceedings.
In 2013 the City moved to modify the settlement; after mediation the parties executed a 2014 addendum adopting some City proposals but leaving Paragraphs 25 and 30 unchanged.
Class representative Peery moved for $476,094.55 in attorneys’ fees for opposing the City’s modification motion; the district court denied fees, concluding the agreement limited fees to enforcement actions.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding the agreement unambiguously restricts future fee awards to enforcement proceedings and does not permit fees for opposing modifications.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees for opposing the City’s modification motion under the settlement agreement/consent decree	Peery argued counsel should receive fees for work opposing modification because the parties preserved their substantive relief and the court‑approved addendum altered the parties’ legal relationship	City argued Paragraph 25 limits future fee awards to enforcement proceedings only and Paragraph 30 (modification) contains no fee provision	Held: No. The agreement unambiguously limits future fees to enforcement proceedings after mediation; modification proceedings do not trigger fee awards
Whether judicial approval of the 2014 addendum made plaintiffs prevailing parties for § 1988 fee purposes despite the fee waiver	Peery argued court approval constituted a judicially‑ordered alteration making them prevailing parties entitled to fees	City relied on the bargained‑for waiver in Paragraph 25 and the absence of fee language in Paragraph 30	Held: The approval does not override the parties’ negotiated limitation; the fee waiver controls
Whether courts may award fees for defending or opposing modifications despite an explicit contractual limitation	Peery cited precedent treating modification opposition as potentially fee‑eligible	City relied on Evans and parties’ freedom to contract away fee claims	Held: Parties’ clear agreement to limit fees is enforceable; courts will not rewrite consent decrees to supply fees where contract language is unambiguous
Standard of interpretation for a court‑approved settlement agreement	Peery urged a broadly remedial reading in light of civil‑rights context	City urged plain‑text enforcement of the negotiated terms	Held: Interpret under contract principles and give effect to the parties’ objective, unambiguous language; enforce the fee limitation as written

Key Cases Cited

Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (settlement agreements may conditionally waive future fee claims)
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (consent decrees materially alter legal relations and can support fee awards)
Waters v. Int’l Precious Metals Corp., 237 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2001) (settlement agreements approved by a court are interpreted under contract principles)
Maloney v. City of Marietta, 822 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1987) (settlement can constitute a special circumstance to deny § 1988 fees when parties agreed to compromise fee rights)
Binta B. ex rel. S.A. v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2013) (plaintiffs who succeed in opposing modifications may be prevailing parties entitled to fees—distinguished here because of an explicit contractual waiver)
Am. Disability Ass’n v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2002) (settlement agreement that the court retains jurisdiction to enforce is the functional equivalent of a consent decree)
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971) (scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners)