David Ortiz v. Domingo Uribe, Jr., Warden, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23033

Ortiz, 18, confessed after polygraph instructions by a detective at the Barstow Sheriff’s Station following an initial Miranda waiver; a polygraph interview was recorded and Ortiz did not take the test.
California state courts suppressed pre-Miranda statements but admitted post-Miranda confessions; Ortiz was convicted on all counts in 2000.
California Court of Appeal affirmed; California Supreme Court denied review as a second appeal claim.
Ortiz filed federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging due process violation from the admitted confession.
District court denied relief, holding Cardwell’s statements were not coercive and the totality of circumstances did not overbear Ortiz’s will.
This court reviews AEDPA standards and considers whether state court decisions were contrary to or unreasonable applications of Supreme Court law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Ortiz’s confession involuntary due to the polygrapher’s empathetic/parental tone?	Ortiz contends the polygrapher’s tone overbore his will.	Cardwell’s tone did not coercively override Ortiz’s will; not enough to render confession involuntary.	No; empathic, parental tone did not render confession involuntary.
Did Detective Cardwell’s concealment of police status or deception about being an ally deprive Ortiz of essential rights?	Deception about identity deprived Ortiz of understanding his rights.	Deception fell within permissible interrogation tactics and did not deprive understanding of rights.	No; deception was within permissible bounds and did not violate due process.
Did implicit promises of leniency or moral appeals coerce Ortiz into confessing?	Implicit promises and moral appeals coerced Ortiz.	Such statements were persuasive but not coercive coercion.	No; statements did not overbear Ortiz’s will or constitute coercion.
Was the AEDPA standard properly applied in reviewing the California Court of Appeal’s decision?	State court decision was unreasonable under governing Supreme Court law.	Court applied AEDPA deferential standard and reasonable factual/legal determinations.	Yes; the state court decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law.

Sotelo v. Indiana State Prison, 850 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1988) (polygraph empathic tone did not render confession involuntary)
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (lies about others to secure confession; not per se coercive)
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (police deception not by itself coercive; rights understanding not defeated)
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (coercive appeals to conscience can render confessions involuntary)
US v. Miller, 984 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1993) (psychological pressure insufficient to override free will; not coercive)
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (cooperation promises not coercive when rights explained and questioning restrained)
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (police mind state irrelevant to voluntariness)
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (no single litmus test for interrogation; voluntariness depends on totality of circumstances)
Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1996) (psychological appeals to conscience not by themselves coercive)