David Nunez-Vasquez v. William Barr, 965 F.3d 272

Petitioner David Nunez‑Vasquez, a Mexican national, was convicted in Virginia of (1) using another’s identification to avoid arrest/prosecution under Va. Code § 18.2‑186.3(B1) (2012) and (2) duty‑to‑stop/related obligations after an accident under Va. Code § 46.2‑894 (2018).
DHS initiated removal proceedings; the IJ found both convictions were crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and denied cancellation of removal; the BIA (single‑member) affirmed.
The BIA relied on precedential BIA decisions for the definition of moral turpitude but issued a non‑precedential, single‑member decision as to the convictions; petitioner timely sought Fourth Circuit review but was removed before a stay was granted.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo whether each Virginia conviction categorically qualifies as a CIMT, applied the categorical approach, and examined the deference owed to the BIA’s rulings.
The court held that neither the failure‑to‑stop conviction nor the identity‑theft conviction (§ 18.2‑186.3(B1)) is categorically a CIMT, vacated the order of removal, and remanded with instructions that the Government facilitate petitioner’s return to the U.S. for further proceedings.

Issue	Nunez‑Vasquez (Petitioner)	Government (Respondent)	Held
Whether Va. Code § 46.2‑894 (failure‑to‑stop) categorically is a CIMT	Statute lacks the culpable intent and can be violated by negligent or minor reporting failures, so not a CIMT	Leaving scene of an accident with knowledge of injury/damage is morally reprehensible and thus a CIMT	Not a CIMT — statute permits convictions based on negligence/constructive knowledge and mere reporting failures; no required culpable mental state or morally reprehensible conduct
Whether Va. Code § 18.2‑186.3(B1) (use of another’s ID to avoid arrest/prosecution/impede investigation) categorically is a CIMT	Statute can reach innocuous or non‑deceptive conduct (use of fictitious identity or misleading private actors), so not a CIMT	The statute involves deceit that obstructs law‑enforcement functions and thus is a CIMT	Not a CIMT — minimum conduct can involve fictitious identities or misleading private persons without intent to harm/obstruct government; deception alone insufficient
Whether the single‑member BIA decision is entitled to Chevron or other deference	N/A (argued BIA erred substantively)	BIA’s precedents support CIMT rulings; deference appropriate	Single‑member BIA decision not entitled to Chevron; its cursory reasoning lacked persuasive force under Skidmore, so court afforded no deference to its CIMT determinations

Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (categorical approach governs element‑based comparisons)
Ramirez v. Sessions, 887 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2018) (defines deference framework and moral turpitude analysis)
Sotnikau v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2017) (CIMT requires culpable mental state and reprehensible conduct)
Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885 (4th Cir. 2014) (Chevron deference to BIA permissible for ambiguous INA terms)
Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902 (4th Cir. 2014) (appellate review limited to BIA decision when BIA issues its own opinion)
Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005) (no deference for BIA’s interpretation of state criminal law elements)
Clarke v. Galdamez, 789 S.E.2d 106 (Va. 2016) (interpreting elements of Va. Code § 46.2‑894: knowledge or should‑have‑known standard)
Flores‑Molina v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2017) (framework for deceit‑related offenses and limits of deception alone constituting CIMT)
Ibarra‑Hernandez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 2014) (use of fictitious identity for benign purposes does not categorically constitute a CIMT)
Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2016) (clarifies that deception‑based CIMT findings typically require additional aggravating factors such as harm or obstruction)