714 F.3d 295
5th Cir.2013Background
- Morales was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child, receiving 35 and 20 year sentences respectively.
- During Morales’s trial, juror Robyn Wyatt, an assistant district attorney, served on the panel after Morales challenged for cause and was not excused; Wyatt testified she could be fair and impartial
- Counsel failed to strike Wyatt and did not review her juror questionnaire; this was followed by affidavits stating no strategic reason for not striking
- Judge Medrano testified that Roberts said they left Wyatt on the jury; Morales’s counsel admitted not reviewing Wyatt’s sheet and that there was no strategic reason for not striking
- Morales moved for a new trial asserting IAC for not using a peremptory strike against Wyatt; the district court and TCCA found no IAC and deferred to credibility determinations
- District court granted habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but on appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding AEDPA’s relitigation bar and state court findings were not objectively unreasonable
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the state courts’ factual findings about trial strategy were objectively reasonable under AEDPA | Morales argues the findings were unreasonable and disregarded key admissions | State courts credited credibility assessments and found a reasonable strategic decision | No; state findings were not objectively unreasonable under AEDPA |
| Whether trial counsel’s decision to seat Wyatt without a for-cause/strike was IAC under Strickland | Morales argues the decision was deficient performance and prejudicial | State courts held decision was a legitimate trial strategy not constituting IAC | Not IAC; not contrary to clearly established federal law under AEDPA |
| Whether implied bias/for-cause bias doctrine governs the case and supports reversal | Applying implied bias required reversal and preservation of error | TCCA held strategy allowed leaving Wyatt on juror; implied bias not controlling | Not reversible error; decision not contrary to or unreasonable application of federal law |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (Supreme Court 1982) (implied bias doctrine discussed by Justice O’Connor)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court 2000) (defines clearly established federal law for AEDPA review)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (Supreme Court 2011) (highly deferential standard in § 2254(d) review)
- Torres v. Thaler, 395 F. App’x 101 (5th Cir. 2010) (not IAC for strategic decision to seat juror admitted biased)
- Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2006) (distinguishable but instructive on strategy vs. actual bias)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Supreme Court 2004) (Confrontation Clause; strategy vs. evidentiary objections)
- Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2006) (implied bias doctrine established; not automatically IAC to seat biased juror)
- Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (Supreme Court 1984) (respect for trial court credibility findings in habeas)
