David Montenegro v. New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles
93 A.3d 290
N.H.2014Background
- Montenegro applied for a vanity plate reading COPSLIE, stating meaning as 'cops lie'
- DMV denied the plate on the basis that it might be insulting and offensive to good taste under Saf-C 514.61(c)(3)
- Director of the DMV affirmed the denial, citing a reasonable person would find COPSLIE offensive to good taste
- Montenegro sought injunctions to force issuance of COPSLIE and to prevent recall of any plate
- Trial court upheld DMV denial under state and federal free speech grounds; Montenegro appealed to the NH Supreme Court
- Court reverses and remands, holding Saf-C 514.61(c)(3) facially unconstitutional as vague
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Saf-C 514.61(c)(3) is unconstitutionally vague | Montenegro argues the standard lacks objective guidance | DMV contends the standard is a permissible discretionary limit | Saf-C 514.61(c)(3) is facially unconstitutionally vague |
| Whether vanity plates are a designated public forum or a nonpublic forum | Montenegro treats vanity plates as designated forum requiring strict scrutiny | DMV treats plates as nonpublic forum with reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restrictions | Court need not decide forum type to find the regulation unconstitutional on its face |
| Whether the decision is saved by a narrower interpretation of the standard | Argues for narrower construction to avoid viewpoint discrimination | Argues for broad discretion consistent with existing rules | Court declined to narrow the text; held the rule is unconstitutionally vague on its face |
| Whether the regulation violates state constitution Article 22 or the First Amendment | Free speech protections are implicated by DMV denial | Regulation withstands scrutiny under applicable forum analysis | Violation found under State Constitution Article 22; federal questions not reached |
| Whether to consider adjustments to Saf-C 514.61(c)(3) to cure vagueness | Would remedy by redefining terms | Remedy not necessary given facial invalidity | Not addressed after holding facial unconstitutionality; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- HippoPress v. SMG, 150 N.H. 304 (N.H. 2003) (forum analysis of speech on government-owned property; not a traditional public forum; concerns about restrictions)
- Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (U.S. 1987) (facial considerations in evaluating regulation restricting expressive activity)
- Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2001) (vagueness when a statute delegates discretionary decisions without clear standards)
- Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (U.S. 1992) (overbreadth and vagueness concerns in speech regulation)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (U.S. 2008) (recognizes limits of government regulation of expression and vagueness)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1972) (vagueness as a due process concern; explicit standards required)
- Act Now to Stop War v. District of Columbia, 905 F. Supp. 2d 317 (D.D.C. 2012) (vagueness and overbreadth; importance of precise regulation in First Amendment)
- United Food v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority, 163 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 1998) (vague language invites arbitrary enforcement)
- Stated additional authority (cited in text), - (-) (supporting reasoning on vagueness and enforcement)