932 F.3d 1184
8th Cir.2019Background
- David Mogard, a Milbank patrol officer hired in 2008, complained in 2016 about patrol-vehicle safety (tires/seatbelts) to supervisors, the city administrator, and a council member and sought a meeting with the mayor.
- The city council voted to terminate Mogard on recommendations from Police Chief Van Vooren and City Administrator Kettwig.
- Mogard sued the City, Van Vooren, and Kettwig under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation and for deprivation of due process (property and liberty interests), and asserted a state-law wrongful-termination claim.
- The district court denied defendants’ summary-judgment motion on qualified immunity; defendants appealed that interlocutory denial.
- The Eighth Circuit reviews qualified immunity de novo and must decide (1) whether a constitutional right was violated and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mogard’s complaints about vehicle safety were protected First Amendment speech | Mogard: complaints were citizen speech on a matter of public concern and protected from retaliation | Defendants: complaints were made pursuant to Mogard’s official duties and thus unprotected | Court: speech was not clearly established as protected; defendants entitled to qualified immunity on individual retaliation claims |
| Whether Mogard had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment | Mogard: termination deprived him of property without due process | Defendants: Mogard was an at-will employee under South Dakota law, so no property interest | Court: Mogard was at-will and had no property interest; defendants entitled to qualified immunity |
| Whether Mogard had a liberty interest (stigma/name-clearing) requiring a pretermination hearing | Mogard: rumors of criminal misconduct stigmatized him; public dissemination triggered name-clearing right | Defendants: no evidence officials made any official/intentional public statements; only community rumor | Court: plaintiff failed to show defendants made stigmatizing statements public; no liberty violation |
| Whether the City can be liable under § 1983 for the termination | Mogard: City acted via council vote and is liable under Monell | City: municipal immunity differs from individual qualified immunity defenses | Court: City is not entitled to qualified immunity; denial of summary judgment as to City was proper and retaliation claim against City remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (public-employee speech pursuant to official duties is not protected)
- Lyons v. Vaught, 875 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir.) (speech that begins pursuant to duties may remain unprotected; qualified immunity where protection not clearly established)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability for official policies/decisions under § 1983)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified-immunity two-step and early resolution)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (clearly-established-law standard)
- Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (property-interest analysis for public employment)
- Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (name-clearing hearing where stigmatizing public statements are made)
- Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d 980 (8th Cir.) (liberty interest requires official/intentional dissemination of stigmatizing allegations)
- Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521 (8th Cir.) (qualified immunity framework and plaintiff’s burden to show law clearly established)