David Minnick v. Dan Winkleski, 14f4th460

Background

In Kenosha County, David Minnick assaulted his wife, fired shots, and was charged with aggravated battery, attempted first-degree murder (read in), multiple counts of first-degree reckless endangerment, and attempted burglary while armed.
Minnick pleaded no contest (after withdrawing an NGI plea), leaving sentencing to the court; exposure included lengthy initial confinement terms under Wisconsin’s bifurcated sentencing scheme.
Trial counsel Laura Walker told Minnick he was “likely” to receive no more than ten years’ initial confinement; the presentence investigation (PSI) recommended a much longer initial confinement range, and the court imposed a longer sentence.
Minnick moved to withdraw his pleas, alleging ineffective assistance because Walker misestimated/guaranteed the sentence; the trial court and Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the claim, finding Walker credible and that a misprediction alone did not establish deficient performance.
Postconviction counsel Michael Zell raised the sentencing-advice claim on appeal but did not argue Walker should have advised Minnick to withdraw his pleas before sentencing; Minnick later argued Zell was ineffective for omitting that claim under Wisconsin’s “clearly stronger” standard.
Minnick filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition raising (1) Walker’s sentencing estimate as ineffective assistance, (2) Walker’s failure to advise on plea withdrawal, and (3) Zell’s failure to raise the withdrawal claim. The district court denied relief; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether AEDPA deference applies to the state-court adjudication of Walker’s sentencing-advice claim	Minnick: state appeals court did not adjudicate the “advice” claim on the merits (distinguishing “guarantee” vs. “advice”), so AEDPA deference should not apply	State: the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decided the claim on the merits; the distinction is semantic	Held: AEDPA deference applies—the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits
Whether Walker’s estimate that Minnick was "likely" to get ≤10 years was constitutionally deficient	Minnick: Walker’s prediction was an unreasonable guarantee/miscalculation that deprived him of effective counsel	State: a mistaken prediction alone is not per se deficient; no evidence of bad faith or gross misjudgment; counsel made a reasonable estimate given experience and case examples	Held: Not deficient—state court’s rejection was reasonable under Strickland and entitled to AEDPA deference
Whether Walker was ineffective for failing to advise Minnick he could withdraw his plea prior to sentencing	Minnick: the PSI’s higher recommendation should have triggered advice to withdraw the plea	State: counsel had no duty to urge withdrawal given the court’s discretion and lack of a likely “fair and just reason”; withdrawal was not clearly viable	Held: Treated through postconviction-counsel analysis; not shown clearly stronger than the claim actually raised
Whether postconviction counsel Zell was ineffective for not raising the plea-withdrawal claim on first appeal ("clearly stronger" test)	Minnick: Zell should have raised the plea-withdrawal claim; it was at least stronger than the sentencing-advice claim	State: Zell reasonably chose the sentencing-advice claim; the unraised withdrawal claim was not clearly stronger given Wisconsin law ("fair and just reason") and doubtful success	Held: Zell’s performance was not deficient—the unraised plea-withdrawal claim was not clearly stronger; state court’s conclusion was reasonable and gets AEDPA deference

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (prejudice standard in plea-context ineffective-assistance claims)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (explains AEDPA’s highly deferential standard for federal habeas review)
Flores-Ortega v. United States, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (counsel’s duty to consult about appeal when a rational defendant would want to appeal)
Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017) (application of Strickland principles to failures to raise claims on appeal)
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009) (discusses interplay of Strickland and AEDPA; double deference on ineffective-assistance claims)