285 So.3d 639
Miss. Ct. App.2019Background
- David Lee May was arrested Oct. 2012 for two aggravated assaults; indicted June 2013; tried Sept. 2017 and convicted on both counts and sentenced to life as a violent habitual offender.
- Multiple continuances occurred: several requested or joined by May (or his counsel), continuances for discovery and counsel preparation, and periods of inactivity after May’s separate drug conviction and appeal.
- Significant unexplained delay occurred: ~17 months of inactivity between Dec. 2013 and Apr. 2015 after May’s drug conviction was finalized; additional delay from Oct. 2016–Sept. 2017 partly attributed to court unavailability.
- May filed pro se and counsel-assisted motions asserting his speedy-trial right at various times (first asserted Nov. 12, 2013; additional filings in 2015–2016), but his counsel also requested continuances that postponed trial dates.
- At trial the State presented eyewitness testimony and physical evidence; May challenged only the speedy-trial delay on appeal, not the sufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (May) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether delay violated constitutional speedy-trial right | Delay (~5 years from arrest to trial) was presumptively prejudicial and unjustified; dismissal required | Delay attributable partly to May and counsel; other delays had good cause or were neutral; no actual prejudice shown | Court affirmed denial of dismissal: Barker factors weighed for State overall |
| Whether reasons for delay weigh heavily against the State | Many delays unexplained or due to court; these should weigh against the State | Several delays resulted from defense continuances, counsel unavailability, and docket issues; some State-caused delays were not heavily weighted | Court: mixed attribution—some delay charged to State (including 17-month and court-unavailability periods), but significant delay also charged to May; overall slightly favors May on this factor |
| Whether May timely asserted his speedy-trial right | May repeatedly sought prompt trial (pro se filings, mandamus) and objected to continuances | May waited >1 year after arrest to demand trial and his counsel joined in several continuances, undermining assertion | Court: May asserted the right but belatedly and inconsistently; factor weighs only slightly for May |
| Whether actual prejudice resulted from delay | Delay impaired defense (lost lineup, missing witness Quave, faded memories) and caused pretrial incarceration anxiety | Lost lineup was irrelevant, missing witness unexplained and not shown to harm defense, and no evidence of impaired testimony; May bears burden to show actual prejudice | Court: no actual prejudice shown; this factor weighs heavily for the State and is dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (establishes four-factor balancing test for speedy-trial claims)
- Flora v. State, 925 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 2006) (applies Barker where delay exceeded two years but lack of actual prejudice defeated claim)
- Smiley v. State, 798 So. 2d 584 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (delay and lack of prejudice—case where absence of actual prejudice defeated speedy-trial claim)
- Manix v. State, 895 So. 2d 167 (Miss. 2005) (long pretrial delay but failure to show actual prejudice outweighed other Barker factors)
- Bateman v. State, 125 So. 3d 616 (Miss. 2013) (burden shifts to prosecution to justify presumptively prejudicial delay)
- De la Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1997) (State must prove defendant prompted delay or show good cause)