David L. Ridenour v. Laura M. Ridenour, 848 S.E.2d 628

David and Laura Ridenour separated after a long marriage; the decree awarded Laura monthly child support of $10,336, which David appealed.
One child, B.R. (born 2009), suffered a traumatic brain injury as an infant and functions at an approximate 4–5 year old level with multiple impairments and ongoing therapeutic needs.
Since 2011 Beatrice Bruno, an occupational therapist, has provided approximately 35 hours/week of services to B.R., mixing occupational, speech, and physical therapy and often performing caretaking tasks (bathing, feeding, bedtime); her fees run about $8,000/month.
Parties agreed Bruno would remain the primary provider and that costs would be split 80% (husband) / 20% (wife); dispute concerned whether Bruno’s fees must be treated as unreimbursed medical expenses (separately apportioned and excluded from the guideline child support calculation) or could be included via a deviation from the guidelines.
Trial court found Bruno provided both therapy and caretaker/respite services for mother and the family, deemed application of the guidelines unjust/inappropriate, deviated from the guidelines, and added husband’s portion of Bruno’s fee to his child support obligation; husband appealed.

Issue	Husband's Argument	Wife's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred in finding evidence that Bruno provided caretaker and respite services beyond therapy	Trial court’s findings that Bruno acted as caretaker and provided respite were unsupported by evidence	Wife asserted husband cannot both approve and repudiate positions (estoppel by approbation/reprobation) and that findings were supported	Court: findings supported by evidence (ore tenus), not plainly wrong; husband’s challenge to facts fails
Whether expenses for Bruno had to be treated solely as unreimbursed medical expenses and excluded from child support calculations	Bruno’s fees are unreimbursed medical expenses under Code § 20‑108.2(D) and thus must be apportioned separately and not added into child support	Trial court could deviate from guidelines where application would be unjust/inappropriate and include such costs in a deviation	Court: § 20‑108.2(D) sets a default but does not bar deviation; trial court properly exercised discretion to deviate and include Bruno’s costs given B.R.’s unique needs

Pommerenke v. Pommerenke, 7 Va. App. 241 (1988) (ore tenus findings entitled to great weight)
Martin v. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15 (1986) (appellate review of factfinding deference for trial court)
Niblett v. Niblett, 65 Va. App. 616 (2015) (child support determination is discretionary but must follow statutory mandates)
Milam v. Milam, 65 Va. App. 439 (2015) (appellate review limits and requirement to consider statutory child support steps)