David L. Jenner and Vickie Jenner v. Bloomington Cellular Services, Inc. and Crown Castle South LLC.
2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 245
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Bloomington Cellular (later merged into Westel) owned property with a 228-ft cell tower; Westel leased tower rights to Crown Castle and Crown Castle recorded a supplemental lease (2000) and a T‑Mobile sublease (2009), both recorded but not in the parcel’s apparent chain of title.
- Jenners bought a tax sale certificate for the Property in October 2014, sent notices based on the chain of title (which showed only Bloomington Cellular), and obtained a tax deed in November 2015 after no redemption.
- Crown Castle first learned of the tax deed after it issued, negotiated unsuccessfully with the Jenners, then intervened and moved under Trial Rule 60(B) to set aside the tax deed as void for lack of statutorily required notice.
- At hearing, Crown Castle relied on its recorded interests and a dated photograph of a sign on the property identifying Crown Castle; Crown Castle conceded its recordings were not discoverable through a routine chain‑of‑title name search available to the Jenners.
- Trial court granted relief under T.R. 60(B), declaring the tax deed void because the Jenners failed to provide notice to “any person with a substantial property interest of public record,” and also found the fence sign placed the Jenners on inquiry notice (the court later declined to rely on an inspection duty).
Issues
| Issue | Jenner(s) Argument | Crown Castle Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the tax deed must be set aside for failure to give statutorily required notice to recorded interestholders | Jenners: They complied by notifying parties shown in the chain of title; tax‑sale purchasers should be treated like bona fide purchasers and not required to search recorded interests outside the chain of title | Crown Castle: Statute requires notice to any person with a substantial property interest of public record, regardless of whether the interest appears in the parcel’s chain of title | Held: The statute requires notice to any person with a substantial public record interest; Jenners’ failure to notify Crown Castle voided the tax deed (affirmed) |
| Whether a tax‑sale purchaser is entitled to bona fide purchaser treatment for notice purposes | Jenners: Tax purchaser should be treated like bona fide purchaser for notice obligations; chain‑of‑title notice suffices | Crown Castle: Tax purchasers are not bona fide purchasers; statute imposes broader notice duties reflecting the speculative nature of tax sales | Held: Tax‑sale purchasers are not bona fide purchasers; statute’s plain language imposes notice to any recorded substantial interest |
| Whether the statute requires a search beyond the chain of title (practical search scope) | Jenners: Requiring searches outside the chain of title is impractical and contrary to legislative intent; title company searches that use conventional chain‑of‑title methods should suffice | Crown Castle: Legislature’s use of “any” and definition of substantial interest of public record indicates notice to all recorded interests, even if outside the immediate chain of title | Held: Court construed “any person with a substantial property interest of public record” to include recorded interests outside a parcel’s apparent chain of title; tax purchasers bear heavier notice burden |
| Whether physical signage placed Crown Castle’s interests on inquiry notice to the Jenners (inspection duty) | Jenners: Sign photo lacked proof of visibility, placement, or posting date; statute does not impose a duty to inspect physical property for unrecorded possessory interests | Crown Castle: Signage was conspicuous and gave contact information, so Jenners were on inquiry notice and could have discovered recorded interests | Held: Court agreed statutory notice, not possession, controlled; it erred to impose a general inspection duty for unrecorded possessory interests, but ruled deed void because Crown Castle had recorded interests and Jenners failed to notify them |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Adoption of C.B.M., 992 N.E.2d 687 (Ind. 2013) (standard of review for Trial Rule 60(B) relief)
- Keybank Nat’l Ass’n v. NBD Bank, 699 N.E.2d 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (record outside the chain of title does not provide notice to bona fide purchasers for value)
- Gates v. Houston, 897 N.E.2d 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (discussion of courts construing forfeiture‑producing statutes strictly in favor of landowners)
- Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1973) (principle that forfeiture is disfavored)
- Roberts v. Feitz, 933 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (marketable title statute effects on competing chains of title)