David Kifer v. State of Indiana, 137 N.E.3d 990

In 2005 the general manager of the Evansville Vanderburgh County Building Authority, David Rector, mailed Kifer a letter stating Kifer was “no longer permitted” in the Civic Center Complex (a public building housing courts, police, and administrative offices).
In 2009 a trial court, referencing the 2005 ban, told Kifer to contact the sheriff for an escort if he needed to enter the building for court-related business.
On March 4, 2019 Kifer entered the Civic Center to report an alleged assault at the police department; screening officers at the entrance knew of the ban but did not stop or escort him; he completed his report and then was arrested.
The State charged Kifer with criminal trespass; a jury found him guilty; a prior trespass conviction enhanced the charge to a Level 6 felony and he received a two-year executed sentence.
On appeal Kifer challenged sufficiency of the evidence, arguing the State failed to prove he entered after being denied entry by the Building Authority or its authorized agent, and also contested the validity of a permanent ban from a public building.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State proved Kifer knowingly entered property after being denied entry by the Building Authority or its agent (agency/authorization element of trespass).	Rector, as general manager, had authority to ban and the 2005 letter was sufficient to show denial by the Authority's agent.	Rector’s own testimony that he could trespass people was insufficient to prove an agency relationship; State did not show manifestation of consent/control by the Authority.	Reversed: State failed to prove Rector was authorized by the Building Authority to impose a permanent ban; insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whether an agent may permanently ban a person from a public building.	The State argued the ban remained effective and lawfulness of denial is not an element the State must prove.	Kifer argued an agent cannot permanently and perpetually ban a person from a public facility open to the public, especially where entry concerns public safety and access to public services.	Court held it is unreasonable to construe the trespass statute to allow an indefinite permanent ban from a public building without proper authorization; the court did not foreclose all bans but required proper agent authorization and more than a perpetual written ban.

Demming v. Underwood, 943 N.E.2d 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (elements for proving actual agency: manifestation, acceptance, and control)
Glispie v. State, 955 N.E.2d 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (agent’s self-declaration is insufficient to prove agency)
Turney v. State, 922 P.2d 283 (Ak. Ct. App. 1996) (permanent ban from courthouse property was not authorized by general trespass statute)
State v. Johnson, 381 So.2d 498 (La. 1980) (holding permanent, perpetual bans from public transportation facilities unreasonable)
Clemons v. State, 987 N.E.2d 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (standard of review for sufficiency of evidence)
Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130 (Ind. 2016) (circumstantial evidence alone can support a conviction)
Frink v. State, 52 N.E.3d 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (clarified that whether denial was ‘lawful’ pertains to the entry element, not to who may authorize a ban)