David Keen v. State of Tennessee
398 S.W.3d 594
| Tenn. | 2012Background
- Keen, a death-row inmate, sought to reopen post-conviction proceedings in 2010 based on new IQ evidence claiming intellectual disability and death-penalty ineligibility.
- The trial court denied the motion; Keen appealed, and Coleman v. State was decided during those proceedings, prompting the court to address retroactivity and the scope of actual innocence.
- Tennessee’s post-conviction framework allows reopening for (a) new constitutional rights (a one-year window) and (b) new scientific evidence of actual innocence; Coleman clarified intellectual-disability standards under §39-13-203.
- The Court held Coleman did not announce a new constitutional right and that “actually innocent of the offense” under §40-30-117(a)(2) means innocence of the underlying offense, not mere death-penalty ineligibility.
- The Court concluded Keen’s WAIS-IV-based evidence did not qualify as “new scientific evidence” under §40-30-117(a)(2) because Keen could not show actual innocence of the underlying first-degree murder offense, and affirmed the lower courts’ denial of reopening.
- Justice Wade filed a dissent arguing for interpreting “offense” to include death-penalty eligibility factors and remanding for merits of the intellectual-disability claim.
- The judgment thus affirmed denial of Keen’s motion to reopen; costs assessed to the State of Tennessee.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retroactivity of Coleman v. State | Keen argues Coleman created a new retroactive right | Coleman did not announce a new constitutional right | Coleman did not establish a new retroactive right |
| meaning of ‘actually innocent of the offense’ in §40-30-117(a)(2) | Keen says intellectual disability makes him actually innocent of the offense | “Offense” refers to the underlying crime, not death-penalty ineligibility | ‘Actually innocent of the offense’ means innocence of the underlying offense (first-degree murder) |
| Scope of new evidence under §40-30-117(a)(2) | WAIS-IV score constitutes new scientific evidence of innocence | Evidence must show innocence of the offense; Coleman’s framework doesn’t convert the IQ score to innocence | WAIS-IV alone does not meet the actual innocence standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) (establishes new constitutional right to_execution of intellectually disabled violated due process and retroactivity)
- Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011) (clarifies that §39-13-203(a)(1) allows consideration of non-score evidence and Flynn effect in I.Q. determinations; not a new constitutional rule)
- Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2004) (discusses standard for I.Q. evidence and Flynn effect; strict bright-line rule rejected)
- Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322 (Tenn. 2011) (applies Coleman principles to remand for I.Q. assessment; confirms Coleman framework)
- In re Webster, 605 F.3d 256 (11th Cir. 2010) (discusses AEDPA’s ‘guilty of the offense’ language and distinctions for capital cases)