David Jones v. Dushan Zatecky, 917 F.3d 578

Background

In 2005 David Jones faced two consolidated domestic-violence prosecutions; the State moved nine days after the joint omnibus date to add a criminal-confinement charge (the First Amendment) and later made other amendments.
Jones’s trial counsel did not object to the untimely First Amendment; Jones was convicted and received the bulk of his sentence for criminal confinement.
Indiana law then (Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5) prohibited substantive amendments after 30 days before the omnibus date; Haak v. State interpreted that rule strictly.
On direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings Indiana courts found the substantive-timeliness challenge waived because counsel failed to object; Fajardo later reversed a similar conviction where an untimely substantive amendment was challenged.
Jones filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asserting ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the untimely substantive amendment; the district court denied relief.
The Seventh Circuit majority followed Shaw v. Wilson and held counsel was constitutionally ineffective and that prejudice existed because a timely objection likely would have led to dismissal of the confinement charge and resentencing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a substantive amendment made after the statutory cutoff	Jones: counsel performed deficiently by not objecting to an untimely substantive amendment under Indiana law (Haak), and but for that error the confinement charge would have been dismissed	State: many Indiana practitioners reasonably declined to press the timeliness claim given split/uncertain precedents and consistent appellate practice allowing late amendments, so counsel's decision was not constitutionally deficient	Held for Jones: counsel's omission was objectively unreasonable under Strickland; counsel should have raised the state-law timeliness claim
Whether Jones was prejudiced by counsel's failure (Strickland prejudice prong)	Jones: there is a reasonable probability the confinement conviction would have been vacated or dismissed (Fajardo demonstrates likely relief)	State: any relief was unlikely; even if error occurred, prejudice is speculative because courts routinely allowed late amendments	Held for Jones: prejudice shown—Fajardo and later state-court reasoning establish dismissal/resentencing was likely, so habeas relief warranted as to confinement conviction
Whether AEDPA deference bars federal habeas relief where the state court rejected the claim on waiver grounds	Jones: the state-court resolution was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law because counsel's omission rendered the claim non-waivable for ineffective-assistance purposes	State: AEDPA requires deference; fair-minded jurists could agree the state court's decision was reasonable given state precedent	Held: AEDPA did not bar relief—the Seventh Circuit concluded the state-court adjudication unreasonably applied Strickland in light of Haak, Shaw, and Fajardo
Scope of relief—what remedy is appropriate	Jones: habeas writ vacating the confinement conviction and ordering resentencing adjustments	State: at most limited relief or denial given deference to state process	Held: Court vacated habeas denial and remanded with instructions to grant the writ within 120 days as to the criminal-confinement conviction and to adjust sentences on remaining counts as needed

Key Cases Cited

Haak v. State, 695 N.E.2d 944 (Ind. 1998) (interpreting Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5 to bar post-omnibus substantive amendments)
Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2007) (reversing conviction where a substantive charge was added after the omnibus date)
Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2013) (Seventh Circuit: counsel ineffective for failing to press untimely-amendment claim under Indiana law)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (clarifying AEDPA deference and unreasonable-application standard)