David Jones v. Clark County, Ky., 690 F. App'x 334

Police traced a 39-second child-pornography video to an IP address registered to David Jones, executed a search warrant, seized electronic devices, and arrested Jones.
Jones denied knowledge of any child pornography during interrogation; police never examined the seized devices to see whether they contained the video.
Officer Lee Murray recommended charges and a grand jury indicted Jones for promoting a minor in a sexual performance under K.R.S. § 531.320(2)(b).
While Jones remained jailed about 14 months, authorities still had not analyzed the devices; in November 2014 Jones’s counsel had an expert examine them and found no child pornography.
The indictment was dismissed in state court and Jones sued Murray under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution; the district court dismissed the § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim, finding Jones failed to allege presentation of false grand-jury testimony and denied leave to amend.
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding questions of material fact existed under the King standard because Murray’s omissions and reckless investigation could rebut the presumption of probable cause created by the indictment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a valid grand-jury indictment conclusively establishes probable cause and bars a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim when an officer omitted material evidence and conducted a reckless investigation	Jones: the indictment was procured by officer misconduct and omission (failure to examine devices that were in police custody), so the presumption of probable cause is rebuttable	Murray: a grand-jury indictment that is facially valid precludes a malicious-prosecution claim; Jones failed to allege false grand-jury testimony	The court held under King that omissions and pre-grand-jury investigative misconduct (not limited to grand-jury testimony) can rebut the presumption of probable cause; dismissal was improper because material questions of fact exist
Whether dismissal for failure to allege presentation of false grand-jury testimony was proper and whether amendment was allowed	Jones: his claim rests on pre-grand-jury omissions/misconduct, not solely on grand-jury testimony; amendment should be permitted	Murray: plaintiff did not allege officer presented false testimony to the grand jury, so indictment is conclusive	The court held Sanders does not bar claims based on pre-grand-jury investigative misconduct; district court erred in dismissing and in denying leave to proceed further; remanded

Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir.) (malicious-prosecution elements include lack of probable cause)
Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647 (6th Cir.) (a facially valid grand-jury indictment generally establishes probable cause)
Sanders v. Jones, 845 F.3d 721 (6th Cir.) (grand-jury witnesses have absolute immunity; testimony alone cannot form basis for § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim)
King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.) (clarifies exception: officer's pre-grand-jury false statements/forged evidence/omissions that are material can rebut the indictment's presumptive probable cause)
Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (Sup. Ct.) (grand-jury witnesses have absolute immunity for testimony)