David Henry v. Adventist Health Castle Med., 970 F.3d 1126

Dr. David Henry, a board-certified surgeon, contracted with Adventist Health Castle Medical Center under a Physician Recruitment Agreement and an On‑Call Agreement that labeled him an "independent contractor."
Under the On‑Call Agreement Henry covered five on‑call days per month, was paid $100 per no‑event shift or $500 per emergency, received 1099s, had no employee benefits, and reported income as self‑employed.
Henry leased OR time at Castle, treated his own patients, maintained privileges and performed surgeries at a competing hospital, and could arrange backup coverage while on call.
Castle controlled selection and payment of surgical assistants, required compliance with hospital policies and peer‑review, and reviewed Henry’s cases, leading to a suspension of his clinical privileges after a quality review.
Henry sued under Title VII for race discrimination and retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment for Castle, holding Henry was an independent contractor; the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Employee status under Title VII	Henry: Hospital’s control over assistants, equipment, mandatory standards, and peer review show employer control	Castle: Payment structure, tax treatment, contract label, lack of benefits, ability to work elsewhere show independent contractor status	Henry was an independent contractor; not an employee under Darden; summary judgment affirmed
Denial of Rule 56(d) continuance/discovery	Henry: Additional discovery would reveal facts opposing summary judgment	Castle: Henry failed to identify specific facts discovery would produce	Denial affirmed — Henry did not meet Rule 56(d) affidavit requirement
Denial of Rule 59(e) motion/reconsideration	Henry: Belated declaration and evidence warranted reconsideration	Castle: Evidence could have been presented earlier; reconsideration improper	Denial affirmed — new evidence was untimely and could have been raised earlier
Post‑judgment motion to amend complaint	Henry: Sought to add claims after judgment	Castle: Amendment requires reopening judgment under Rule 59/60 first	Denial affirmed — amendment improper after entry of judgment without reopening

Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (common‑law right‑to‑control test for employee status)
Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (employee status is a question of law when facts undisputed)
Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 1999) (Title VII protects employees, not independent contractors)
Cilecek v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 115 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 1997) (physician‑hospital independent contractor analysis)
Murray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2010) (no functional difference between economic realities and Darden tests)
Barnhart v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1998) (independent contractor where worker operated business with autonomy)
Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996) (physician treated own patients and lacked employee benefits—contractor status)
Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2004) (tax treatment and lack of W‑2 support independent contractor finding)
Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 514 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008) (intensive hospital control can create factual dispute on employment status)
Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard Mem’l Hosp., 853 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1988) (physician employment claim survived motion to dismiss under different factual allegations)