David Heinz v. Carrington Mortgage Services, 3f4th1107

Background

Heinz obtained a mortgage in 2008, defaulted repeatedly, and previously received loan modifications; the loan was assigned to Bank of America (BANA) in June 2016.
After a 2016–2017 default, BANA scheduled a foreclosure; Carrington became the loan servicer on July 11, 2017 and communicated with Heinz about loss-mitigation/application completeness.
Heinz and the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office submitted documents and were repeatedly told the application was incomplete; Carrington allegedly told the AG’s office on Nov. 7, 2017 that the file had been sent to underwriting.
Carrington proceeded with a nonjudicial foreclosure sale on Nov. 14, 2017; BANA purchased the property; Carrington sent a cancellation notice dated after the sale and later declined to rescind the sale one day after the statutory redemption period expired.
Carrington’s letters included the FDCPA “mini‑Miranda” disclosure; Heinz sued asserting FDCPA §§ 1692e and 1692f claims and state-law claims; district court dismissed state claims and granted summary judgment for Carrington on the FDCPA claims.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the challenged communications were not made “in connection with the collection of a debt.”

Issues

Issue	Heinz's Argument	Carrington's Argument	Held
Whether the communications were "in connection with" debt collection under the FDCPA (§§1692e, 1692f)	Carrington used false/misleading statements and unfair tactics during loss-mitigation to induce payment or otherwise facilitate collection	Communications were informational about application status and did not demand payment or threaten collection	Not in connection with collection; animating‑purpose test not satisfied; summary judgment for Carrington affirmed
Whether the FDCPA “mini‑Miranda” disclaimer transforms informational letters into debt‑collection communications	The disclaimer shows the letters were for the purpose of collecting a debt	The boilerplate disclaimer alone does not change the substantive purpose of the communications	Boilerplate disclosure does not, by itself, convert informational communications into FDCPA debt‑collection communications
Whether post‑foreclosure communications (after sale) are actionable	Post‑sale misrepresentations about underwriting and sale purchaser were false and prejudicial	After foreclosure, Carrington was no longer seeking payment; post‑sale statements therefore not tied to collection	Post‑sale statements were not in connection with collection and, in any event, were immaterial to Heinz’s legal rights
Whether Carrington’s alleged delay/ignoring of application constituted unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt (§1692f)	Delays were tactical to frustrate dual‑tracking claims and to collect by foreclosure	Conduct related to processing loss‑mitigation, not to inducing payment; no request for payment occurred	Delay/processing conduct did not show an intent to collect payment and thus did not violate §1692f

Key Cases Cited

McIvor v. Credit Control Servs., Inc., 773 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2014) (adopts animating‑purpose test for FDCPA §1692e connection requirement)
Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029 (2019) (foreclosure is a means of collecting a debt; context matters for FDCPA status)
Bailey v. Sec. Nat’l Servicing Corp., 154 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 1998) (account‑status notices without demand are not collection communications)
Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010) (mini‑Miranda language does not automatically make a communication a debt‑collection attempt)
Goodson v. Bank of Am., N.A., [citation="600 F. App'x 422"] (6th Cir. 2015) (disclaimer alone does not transform informational letter into FDCPA collection activity)
Grden v. Leikin Ingber & Winters PC, 643 F.3d 169 (6th Cir. 2011) (animating purpose not shown where statements did not demand payment or threaten consequences)
Hill v. Accounts Receivable Servs., LLC, 888 F.3d 343 (8th Cir. 2018) (false statement must be material to be actionable under FDCPA)